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Abstract
The theory of abstract argumentation frameworks (afs) has, in the main, fo-
cused on finite structures, though there are many significant contexts where
argumentation can be regarded as a process involving infinite objects. To ad-
dress this limitation, in this paper we propose a novel approach for describing
infinite afs using tools from formal language theory. In particular, the possi-
bly infinite set of arguments is specified through the language recognized by a
deterministic finite automaton while a suitable formalism, called attack expres-
sion, is introduced to describe the relation of attack between arguments. The
proposed approach is shown to satisfy some desirable properties which can not
be achieved through other “naive” uses of formal languages. In particular, the
approach is shown to be expressive enough to capture (besides any arbitrary
finite structure) a large variety of infinite afs including two major examples
from previous literature and two sample cases from the domains of multi-agent
negotiation and ambient intelligence. On the computational side, we show that
several decision and construction problems which are known to be polynomial
time solvable in finite afs are decidable in the context of the proposed formalism
and we provide the relevant algorithms. Moreover we obtain additional results
concerning the case of finitary afs.
Keywords: Infinite argumentation frameworks, Automata-based
representation, Argumentation semantics computation
1. Introduction
The theory of abstract argumentation frameworks (afs) has advanced con-
siderably since its original formulation in the work of Dung [37]. Now recognised
as a core research topic within the field of AI in general and its sub-disciplines
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concerned with knowledge representation and multiagent systems in particu-
lar, afs have proven a powerful modelling tool to address reasoning issues in
contexts where classical deductive logic is not the most suitable technique. An
overview of the role of argumentation in AI may be found in recent surveys
such as that of Bench-Capon and Dunne [14] or the comprehensive collection
of introductory articles in Rahwan and Simari [77]. In total matters of seman-
tics, algorithms and computational complexity have occupied many researchers
to the extent that their key properties are, now, reasonably well understood.
Partly in consequence of such understanding, a rich body of subsequent work
has emerged promoting developments of Dung’s basic formalism in order to en-
compass scenarios within which the purely abstract approach of [37] is felt to
be too limiting. Among the many notable contributions of this nature one finds
proposals such as the preference-based afs of Amgoud and Cayrol [2]; the value-
based model of Bench-Capon [15]; eafs from Modgil [64]; recursive attacks in
the afra mechanism from Baroni et al. [5]; divers treatments of weighted frame-
works such as Dunne et al. [43]; as well as sophisticated developments of the
basic “binary attack” concept from [37] such as the adf model from Brewka
and Woltran [25, 24] and the constrained afs of Coste-Marquis et al. [32, 35].
Amidst the wealth and variety of treatments stemming from [37] one can,
however, note a common factor: invariably discussion is focused on finite en-
vironments be they finite sets of basic arguments or finite attack relationships
over these. In contrast, consideration of infinite scenarios has been largely ne-
glected. This turns out to be a limitation from a theoretical, conceptual, and
practical perspective.
From a theoretical viewpoint, infinite frameworks extend (and, in a sense,
complete) the range of investigation on abstract argumentation semantics and
their properties. In fact, infinite afs have been the subject of specific atten-
tion in the seminal paper by Dung, whose fundamental results do not rely on
finiteness. Subsequently, infinite afs have sometimes been considered per se as
significant testbeds for examining semantics properties which, though holding
in the finite case, may be challenging to prove or fail to hold in the infinite case.
For instance, the existence of semi-stable extensions [29] is guaranteed for finite
frameworks, while an infinite framework admitting no semi-stable extensions
has been devised in [30] (and will be recalled in Section 7.1) and the existence
of semi-stable extensions for finitary frameworks has been proved in [91]. Apart
from theoretical interest, this kind of results may be useful to shed new light
on fundamental issues underlying the definition of different semantics, thus en-
abling a broader view and deeper understanding in comparing and assessing
them.
From a conceptual perspective, considering finite frameworks corresponds
to (i) adopting a closed view of the argumentation process, which is bounded
to terminate after a finite number of steps and (ii) excluding reasoning about
infinite domains. Assumption (i) contrasts with the intrinsically open nature
of the argumentation process, arising from the fundamental distinction between
the concepts of “demonstration by proof ” and “persuasion through argument”.
That is to say, as noted in [14, p. 620]: “Arguments are defeasible: the reasoning
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that formed a persuasive case, in the light of changes of viewpoint or awareness
of information not previously available, may fail to convince. This defeasibility
is never removed: an argument may cease to be challenged and so accepted, but
the possibility of challenge remains.”. In other words, the finite view can (at
best) describe a “snapshot” of the notional complete context within which an
argumentation process could evolve due to potential (but as yet unvoiced) chal-
lenge to the conclusions derived. On the other hand, limitation (ii) prevents the
use of the abstract argumentation formalism in contexts where reasoning has to
deal with open-ended scenarios. For instance, considering an open time hori-
zon, one may want to encompass the existence of infinite arguments associated
with infinitely many time instants: this kind of approach has been proposed by
Pollock to model reasoning about temporal persistence of beliefs [74].
From the practical perspective, it has to be remarked that systems giving
rise to a potentially infinite automated production of arguments may well oc-
cur in actual applications. On one hand, there are well-known correspondences
between argumentation frameworks and other kinds of reasoning systems poten-
tially producing infinite derivations: an example concerning logic programming
is in fact given in Appendix A of [37] and will be recalled in this paper. On
the other hand, abstract argumentation is widely adopted as a general tool to
model dialogues with different purposes (e.g. deliberation, negotiation, persua-
sion) between self-interested agents in a multi-agent system. In such a context
the opportunistic behavior of each agent, driven by “selfish” criteria, and the ab-
sence of global coordination and shared information may lead to non-terminating
argument exchanges [10].
Adding to the considerations above the fact that, as already recalled, Dung’s
original work not only addresses infinite afs as objects of interest but also
establishes a number of fundamental properties of such in the context of the
basic semantics put forward for afs, it appears that the very limited coverage
of infinite frameworks in the subsequent literature represents an important and,
to some extent, surprising lacuna in the field.
This work contributes to fill this gap by addressing the problem of defining
finite specifications of infinite afs through formal languages and proposing an
approach based on finite automata. This proposal consists of two basic elements:
a description of the (infinite) set of arguments through a finite automaton, and a
description of the attack relations linking arguments together through an attack
expression. More precisely, the attack expression specifies a mapping between
regular expressions describing sets of arguments, with the intended meaning
that a set S is attacked by the elements of the set obtained from S through the
mapping. The combination of the automaton describing the set of arguments
and of the attack expression will be called the af specification and will be
shown to be expressive enough to encompass a variety of infinite argumentation
frameworks, including the major examples available in the literature.
Clearly, a sufficiently expressive specification formalism needs to be com-
plemented by some suitable computational mechanism for the evaluation of
argument justification status, which represents the main goal of any applica-
tion of computational argumentation, either in finite or infinite contexts. The
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proposed approach is shown to be satisfactory also from this viewpoint, be-
ing able to support the definition of suitable algorithms for some “standard”
computational problems in argumentation semantics.
The paper is organised as follows. We lay down the context of the work,
discuss motivations, and introduce application examples in Section 2. We then
recall the necessary technical background on Dung’s argumentation framework
and on formal languages in Section 3. In Section 4 we state a set of basic require-
ments for a representation formalism for infinite frameworks and show that they
are not satisfied by a straightforward naive approach one may adopt. Section
5 introduces and illustrates with a trailing set of examples the af specification
formalism for infinite frameworks and shows that it is expressive enough to cap-
ture also “regular” finite frameworks and frameworks that can be regarded as
composed by a finite subframework and one or more infinite subframeworks.
Section 6 introduces effective computational procedures1 for several standard
decision problems in argumentation semantics in the context of the af specifi-
cation formalism. Section 7 demonstrates the suitability of the approach, both
on the representation and on the computational side, by analyzing in detail its
application to four examples: two infinite frameworks previously introduced in
the literature for the sake of theoretical analysis and two examples of infinite
argumentation in multi-agent systems taken from Section 2. Section 8 discusses
related works whilst Section 9 concludes and proposes some areas for future
work. Appendix A recalls the basics of formal language and automata the-
ory to make the paper self-contained, while proofs of all technical results are
collected in Appendix B.
2. Context and motivations
Quoting Prakken [76], Dung’s paper on abstract argumentation framework
“was a breakthrough in three ways: it provided a general and intuitive semantics
for the consequence notions of argumentation logics (and for nonmonotonic log-
ics in general); it made a precise comparison possible between different systems
(by translating them into his abstract format); and it made a general study of
formal properties of systems possible, which are inherited by instantiations of
his framework.” Due to its abstract nature, Dung’s formalism “is best seen not
as a formalism for directly representing argumentation-based inference problems
but as a tool for analysing particular argumentation systems and for develop-
ing a metatheory of such systems”. In this perspective, investigation of infinite
afs finds its motivations in the variety of more concrete contexts and systems
where infinite structures play a role and that can be modeled using afs. A (non
exhaustive) account is given in the following subsections.
1According to [80, p. 55] (but also [63, p. 210] and others) an effective computational
procedure is “a method each step of which is precisely predetermined and which is certain to
produce the answer in a finite number of steps”.
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2.1. Argumentation models and systems
Infinite entities have been encompassed at a foundational level by all the
main literature approaches to formal argumentation. In fact, both before and
after Dung’s work, other “less abstract” approaches have been defined which for-
malize arguments and their structure in various ways, with the common property
of referring to a generic (and often only partially specified) language, encom-
passing infinite structures.
In the formalization of defeasible reasoning by Simari and Loui [81] an ar-
gument structure comprises a possibly infinite set of sentences supporting a
conclusion, and, in turn, the set of all possible argument structures is infinite.
In the theory of assumption-based argumentation [23] an assumption-based
framework consists of a set of beliefs and a set of assumptions which are possibly
infinite subsets of a language consisting of countably many sentences. Again
the infinite case is explicitly considered in the theoretical analysis of semantics
properties in the framework.
In Vreeswijk’s abstract argumentation systems [89, 9] arguments are re-
stricted to have a finite set of premises, but the set of arguments is possibly
infinite and infinite argumentation sequences (involving either finite or infinite
sets of arguments) are used as a formal tool for extension evaluation, by in-
troducing a notion of “limit” for infinite argumentation sequences. In [89] it is
remarked in particular that some desirable limit properties of infinite argumen-
tation sequences may not hold when an infinite set of arguments is considered.
This is left as an open problem, which, as to our knowledge, has still to be
solved.
In DEFLOG [87] the central notion is the “dialectical interpretation” of a
theory, which basically is a (possibly infinite) set of sentences related by two
connectives representing support and defeat relations respectively.
Finally, in the more recent ASPIC formalism [1] and its ASPIC+ evolution
[76] arguments with an infinite number of subarguments (and hence infinite
sets of arguments) are encompassed and none of the main properties relies on
argument finiteness.
It can hence be stated that the consideration of infinite structures and deriva-
tions has been consistently regarded as a basic, one could even say “natural”,
feature in argumentation formalisms. It has however to be acknowledged that
this feature has typically been regarded as problematic when moving from (more
or less abstract) theory to complete specification (and implementation) of actual
argumentation-based reasoning systems. In fact, the unbounded open nature
of argumentative reasoning has often been contrasted with the practical needs
and limitations of resource-bounded agents.
From a philosophical stance, this contrast has been pointed out by Pollock
[72] by introducing the distinction between justified beliefs and warranted propo-
sitions. Quoting Pollock, “at each stage of reasoning, if the reasoning is correct
then a belief held on the basis of that reasoning is justified, even if subsequent
reasoning will mandate its retraction” while “in contrast to justification, war-
rant is what the system of reasoning is ultimately striving for. A proposition is
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warranted in a particular epistemic situation if and only if, starting from that
epistemic situation, an ideal reasoner unconstrained by time or resource limita-
tions would ultimately be led to believe the proposition”. In this view, warrant
may be regarded as a sort of unattainable goal for a pratical resource-bounded
agent, which needs to be content with the more limited notion of justification.
From the practical side, an example of the problems in dealing with in-
finite structures is presented in [52] in the context of the DeLP (Defeasible
Logic Programming) system. Here, one of the central notions is the one of
an “argumentation line”, which is basically a sequence of argument structures
where each element of the sequence is a defeater of its predecessor. As dis-
cussed in [52] infinite argumentation lines may easily emerge for various reasons
(e.g. self-defeating arguments, reciprocal defeaters, non-concordant sets of sup-
porting arguments). Since managing infinite argumentation lines is regarded
as undesirable, suitable restrictions are introduced in the formal definition of
argumentation line to avoid these cases.
A different kind of restriction is adopted in the argumentation-based ap-
proach to Defeasible Logic proposed in [54]. Here, an argument is a possibly
infinite proof tree for a literal p (associated with the tree root). By definition,
however, only finite arguments can be acceptable (this rather drastic choice is
motivated by the goal of avoiding the risk of supporting “well-known fallacies
such as circular argument and infinite regress”) while infinite arguments keep
anyway the power to prevent justification of other arguments.
In the context of the logic-based approach to argumentation of Besnard and
Hunter [16] the classical chicken and egg dilemma is used as a common sense
reasoning example giving rise to an infinite sequence of arguments, each being a
counterargument to the preceding one (such a sequence is called dispute in this
context). In fact, dilemmas (of various nature and possibly more interesting
than chicken and egg) are recognized as a significant case of infinite reasoning
with conflicting arguments also in non-technical literature.
An example is given in the novel “Runaround” by Isaac Asimov where, on the
planet Mercury, a robot, called SPD-13, receives by two spacemen the order to
accomplish a mission which requires to collect selenium from a pool. The robot
is programmed to obey three basic rules which can be synthesized as follows.
The first rule states that the robot has to protect human lives. The second rule
states that the robot has to obey orders unless they conflict with the first rule.
The third rule states that the robot has to protect itself unless this conflicts with
the first rule. After a long wait, the spacemen send out another (less capable)
robot to look for SPD-13. From the report of the second robot they realize that
the mind of SPD-13 is in a loop (which has caused a sort of “drunkenness”)
which can be described as follows: when the robot gets near the selenium pool
it perceives an unforeseen danger, the third rule is activated and the robot builds
an argument to go away, prevailing on the previous decision to obey the order.
When the robot is sufficiently far from the pool, its danger perception decreases
and so according to the second rule it builds a new argument which leads it to
turn back towards the pool, prevailing over the previous decision. When it gets
sufficiently closer to the pool, it feels the danger again and the process restarts.
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From the representation point of view in [16] this kind of problems is tackled
by imposing some restriction in the definition of the argument tree structure,
which is meant to capture all the disputes concerning a specific argument (rep-
resented by the root of the tree). More precisely, the premises of an argument
added to the tree are forbidden to be a subset of the union of the premises
of its ancestors. With this constraint, the argument tree for the chicken and
egg dilemma reduces to a two-length chain, but, as observed in [16, p. 62] “the
argument tree is merely a representation of the argumentation” and “altough
the argument tree is finite, the argumentation here is infinite and unresolved”.
An explicit restriction to finite structures is also adopted in a recent work
concerning the study of postulates and properties of logic-based instantiations of
abstract argumentation [53]. In this work, a propositional logic with a countable
set of propositional letters is used as a basis for the argumentation process. It
ensues that the set of all arguments is countably infinite (though, by definition,
an argument is assumed to be built on a finite set of formulae). However,
when introducing the notion of argument graph, where nodes are arguments
and the arcs represent the attack relation, the authors restrict the consideration
to graphs with a finite number of nodes.
2.2. Multi-agent systems
From the previous subsection it appears that while the potential existence of
infinite structures is widely acknowledged in non-abstract argumentation con-
texts too, there is a prevailing attitude to overlook the difficult problem of actu-
ally managing them, by ascribing their genesis to undesirable/pathological con-
ditions which can be avoided at the implementation level with proper program-
ming and preventive checks on the knowledge base. While it is certainly true
that infinite argumentation structures may arise from uninteresting/undesirable
conditions, we remark that these do not exhaust the range of cases where such
structures may arise and that, whatever the underlying reason, their emergence
can not always be prevented. In fact, there are concrete situations where system-
atic well-founded argument generation mechanisms may incur in an open-ended
non-terminating behavior.
Multi-agent (and more generally distributed) systems provide a major case
for this statement, under the non restrictive and fairly standard assumptions of
self-interest and absence of a global reasoner to which all information is available.
For instance in [17] argumentation semantics of Defeasible Logic is extended
to the case of a multi-context system for distributed ambient intelligence. Each
context corresponds to the local knowledge and reasoning of an agent and argu-
ments of different contexts are interrelated through mapping rules. As to unde-
sirable circularities, it is observed that “loops in the local knowledge bases can
be easily detected and removed without needing to interact with other agents.
However, even if there are no loops in the local theories, the global knowledge
base may contain loops caused by mapping rules.” Such loops in the global
knowledge base may cause infinite argumentation lines. In [17] this problem is
dealt with by adopting the specific assumptions that (i) each agent uses its own
vocabulary and is therefore the unique responsible of the evaluation of some
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literals, (ii) the agents behave in a fully cooperative manner in the process of
justification evaluation.
In fact, unless one adopts some restrictive assumptions of this kind, the
possible onset of non terminating behaviors in argument defeat status compu-
tation is inherent to multi-agent system. This is formally proved in [10] where
it is shown that approaches to distributed defeat status computation (see for
instance [61, 70]) usually rely on assumptions like a predefined unmodifiable
number of agents, the existence of a centralized structure, or the obligation to
reveal the entire inner structure of the arguments an agent has built. Removing
these restrictions and assuming a multi-agent system with the general properties
of unlimited cardinality, autonomy, asynchronism, dynamism, and uncostrained
communication (see [10] for details), an impossibility result is obtained showing
that no self-stabilizing algorithm can exist for defeat status computation accord-
ing to any semantics which is valid (namely obeys some fairly general constraint
on the defeat status assignment). The paper provides two practical examples of
non terminating behavior: a distributed version of the three liars paradox intro-
duced by Pollock [73] and a negotiation dialogue for resource exchange among
three agents2.
In the following subsections we provide two extended examples of infinite
argumentation in multi-agent systems, namely an infinite negotiation process
and a distributed reasoning process involving the components of an ambient
intelligence system. These examples are inspired to the application contexts
considered in [10] and [17] and will be used in Section 7 to demonstrate the
application of the formalism proposed in this paper.
2.2.1. An example in multi-agent negotiation
In multi-agent systems, independent and possibly self-interested components
strive to achieve common or individual goals by various forms of interaction
(cooperation, negotiation, persuasion, resource exchange, task allocation, . . . )
for most of which argumentation is considered a suitable model in the literature
(see for instance [78] and the references thereof).
If one considers interactions involving more than two agents and removes
some not always realistic assumptions (e.g. that information on all argument
exchanges is available to all agents) the interaction process may not reach a
solution and continue forever with an infinite production of arguments.
To exemplify, consider a simple negotiation setting where three agents A1,
A2 and A3 may exchange resources called Ra, Rb, Rc. Each agent possesses some
resource and has its own preference ordering on resources. Each agent is only
partially informed on the resources owned by other agents and can not know
the preferences of other agents. At a given time instant, an agent Ax builds an
2By the way, in the context of this example, in [10] it is remarked that the existence of
circularities at the global level is not critical per se, since they do not give rise to any problem
if there are further attacking arguments breaking the cycle. Thus, simply forbidding cycles
turns out to be a too drastic measure in general.
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argument for proposing to Ay an exchange between resources Rx and Ry if the
following conditions holds: (i) Ax owns Rx; (ii) Ax knows that Ay owns Ry; (iii)
Ax prefers Ry to Rx. An agent receiving a proposal may accept or reject it at
a later time: the agent who has sent the proposal is free to withdraw it before
receiving confirmation of acceptance (typically because the agent has received a
more convenient exchange proposal which conflicts with the previous one). An
agent is free to reiterate a proposal after having withdrawn it (typically because
the reason to withdraw does not hold any more) and is obliged to withdraw an
offer s/he has made before accepting an incompatible offer s/he has received.
Message exchanges between two agents are not available to other agents but they
are collected by an authority supervising the negotiation arena. The authority
is informed on all the exchanged messages and on the resources possessed by
all agents but has not access to agents’ preference rankings. The authority may
therefore build an argumentation framework representing the evolution of the
negotiation process and may help agents to overcome critical situations. We
suppose that the attack relation in the argumentation framework managed by
the authority is defined on the basis of the two following rules:
• a (possibly reiterated) proposal P1 (received or sent by an agent Ai) at-
tacks a (possibly reiterated) proposal P2 (received or sent by the same
agent Ai) if accepting the exchange proposed in P1 makes impossible the
exchange proposed in P2;
• a withdrawal obviously attacks the withdrawn proposal, a reiterated pro-
posal attacks the corresponding previous withdrawal.
Suppose now that the initial situation is the one described in Table 1.
Agent ID Owns Knows Preference rank
A1 Rc A2 owns Rb Ra > Rb > Rc
A2 Rb A3 owns Ra Rc > Ra > Rb
A3 Ra A1 owns Rc Rb > Rc > Ra
Table 1: Initial situation of the negotiation example.
Then each agent builds an offer as follows:
• A1 sends an offer to A2 proposing an exchange between Rc and Rb: O1 =
Off(t0, (A1, A2, Exch(Rc, Rb)))
• A2 sends an offer to A3 proposing an exchange between Rb and Ra: O2 =
Off(t0, (A2, A3, Exch(Rb, Ra)))
• A3 sends an offer to A1 proposing an exchange between Ra and Rc: O3 =
Off(t0, (A3, A1, Exch(Ra, Rc)))
Clearly each offer is incompatible with the two others.
It can be seen that each agent prefers the status resulting from the exchange
in the offer s/he has received wrt the one resulting from the offer s/he has
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made. For instance, agent A1 prefers exchanging Rc with Ra (as proposed by
A3) than exchanging Rc with Rb (as s/he has proposed to A2). Then, let say
at time t1, each agent sends a message of withdrawal of the previous offer:
W1 = Wd(t1, (A1, A2, Exch(Rc, Rb))), W2 = Wd(t1, (A2, A3, Exch(Rb, Ra))),
W3 =Wd(t1, (A3, A1, Exch(Ra, Rc))).
As a consequence of the withdrawal and of its local view, each agent is now,
let say at time t2, in a position where the only reasonable move is to reiterate
the initial offer (let say that these messages are denoted as O4, O5, O6): clearly
this reproduces the initial situation, causes three further withdrawals and the
process goes on forever3.
2.2.2. An example in ambient intelligence
Consider a system of ambient intelligence consisting of several independently
developed interacting components, some of which join and leave dynamically the
system, as described in [17].
Adapting an example presented in [17] suppose that the system includes the
following components:
• a people locator;
• a video surveillance system for each room;
• a lighting management system for each room;
• personal smartphones.
The components interact as follows:
• personal smartphones notify their position to the people locator;
• the video surveillance system notifies the results about people detection
to the people locator;
• the lighting management system has a light sensor and informs the video
surveillance system whether each room is dark or not;
• the people locator informs the lighting system about people’s presence in
each room.
The people locator uses the following rules:
R1: if a smartphone is in a room the smartphone owner is in the room
3Note that a similar situation occurs also if we assume that each agent updates its knowl-
edge on who owns what after the first round of offers. In that case the roles of bidder and
addressee would be interchanged (e.g. the exchange of Rb with Rc would be proposed by A2
to A1 and so on), but the non-terminating sequence of offers and withdrawals would occur in
the same way.
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R2: if the video surveillance notifies the presence of a person in a room then
there is a person in the room
R3: if the video surveillance notifies the absence of any person in a room then
there is no person in the room
R4: if a person is present in a room at time t then the person is present in the
room at time (t+1)
R5: if a person is not present in a room at time t then the person is not present
in the room at time (t+1)
The video surveillance system uses the following rules:
R6: if it is not dark and the image processing system recognizes a person in a
room then the video surveillance system notifies the presence of a person
in the room
R7: if it is not dark and the image processing system does not recognize any
person in a room then the video surveillance system notifies the absence
of any person in the room
The lighting system uses the following rules:
R8: if it is dark in a room and a person is in the room switch the room lights
on
R9: if the lights are on in a room and no person is in the room switch the room
lights off
The people locator uses two default persistence rules (R4 and R5) which
can be applied in absence of new information and are the weakest ones: in
case of conflicting conclusions those derived using R4 and R5 are overruled by
those derived using R1, R2, and R3. Moreover video surveillance is regarded as
providing more reliable information than the mere presence of a smartphone,
hence R3 is stronger than R1.
To make the presentation compact, let us omit the details concerning mes-
sage exchanges among the various components and, as a consequence, combine
rules together where possible. The set of rules presented above can be repre-
sented by the following logic program4 M , where not denotes negation as failure
and ¬ denotes explicit negation.
4The program, with the restriction to a finite time horizon, has been run in DLV.
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M :
in(p, r, t) ← phone(x), person(p), owner(x, p), room(r), phonein(x, r, t),
not videovalid(r, t) (r1)
in(p, r, t) ← room(r), person(p), videorecogn(p, r, t), videovalid(r, t) (r2)
¬in(p, r, t) ← room(r), person(p),¬videorecogn(p, r, t), videovalid(r, t) (r3)
in(p, r, s(t)) ← person(p), phone(x), room(r), owner(x, p), in(p, r, t),
not videovalid(s(t)), not phlocated(x, s(t)) (r4)
¬in(p, r, s(t)) ← person(p), phone(x), room(r), owner(x, p),¬in(p, r, t),
not videovalid(r, s(t)), not phlocated(x, s(t)) (r5)
lighton(r, s(t)) ← room(r), person(p), in(p, r, t), dark(r, t) (r6)
¬lighton(r, s(t)) ← room(r), person(p),¬in(p, r, t) (r7)
phlocated(x, t) ← phone(x), room(r), phonein(x, r, t) (r8)
videovalid(r, t) ← not dark(r, t), room(r) (r9)
Most predicates in M have self-explaining names. We assume that vari-
able t refers to time instants, which are discrete and totally ordered, and that
s(t) denotes the successor of instant t. We assume that information about the
presence of smartphones, darkness, and the outcome of the video recognition
system is available for each room in the form of asserted or explicitly negated
facts at each time instant, as provided by the relevant devices. In particular,
we assume that the image processing component returns either videorecogn or
¬videorecogn for each triple (p, r, t) and, of course, does not recognize any per-
son when it is dark. We also assume that all devices are properly working so
that, in particular, when light is on in a room r at time t the predicate dark(r, t)
is false.
R1 is represented by line (r1) ofM with the condition not videovalid(r, t) to
ensure priority to the video surveillance system when its output is valid, namely
when it is not dark in the room, as specified by (r9). Line (r2) synthesises
rules R2 and R6, and, similarly, (r3) synthesises R3 and R7. The persistence
rules R4 and R5 are represented by lines (r4) and (r5) with the conditions
not videovalid(s(t)) and not phlocated(s(t)) to ensure that other rules prevail
when information from devices is available and valid (for phones (r8) applies,
where the predicate phlocated(x, t) means that the location of phone x, whatever
it is, is known at instant t). Rules R8 and R9, concerning the lighting system
are represented respectively by lines (r6) and (r7).
Suppose now that Brian at time instant 0 (when outside is dark) exits the
office, switches the light off and forgets his smartphone.
It follows that, applying (r1), in(Brian, office, 0) is derived and as a conse-
quence, by (r6), light is switched on at instant 1. Then the room is no more dark,
videovalid(office, 1) holds by (r9) and since ¬videorecogn(Brian, office, 1) holds,
by (r3) ¬in(Brian, office, 1) is derived and, applying (r7), the light is switched
off. As a consequence at instant 2 the room is dark and videovalid(office, 2) can
not be derived. (r1) then applies and in(Brian, office, 2) is derived, it follows
that, by (r6), light is switched on at instant 3, and so on.
2.2.3. Non-cooperative dialogues
To avoid situations of the kind described in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, most
argumentation-related dialogue protocols in the literature (see for instance [90,
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88, 42, 75, 62]) concern the two-party case, which implies in particular that all
moves are known to all dialogue participants, and assume that both participants
accept some rules (in particular some kind of non repetition constraint) in order
to guarantee termination5. While, as already remarked, this guarantee can not
be extended to more general contexts, it can also be observed that works en-
compassing non-cooperative, and hence potentially infinite, two-party dialogues
have been considered in the literature (see for instance [51, 50]). In particular,
in [51] the authors describe several kinds of non-cooperative dialogue games,
such as so-called stone-walling tactics. An example [51][p.178] is the following
game between two agents, the proponent (P ) and the opponent (O):
Example 1. Example of stone-walling:
m1: Assert α (P )
m2: Reject α (O)
m3: Assert α (P )
m4: Assert β (O)
m5: Argue since α, either ¬β or β 0 ¬α (P )
m6: Assert λ (O)
m7: Argue since α, either ¬λ or λ 0 ¬α (P )
m8: . . .
P makes substantially the same move from m5 onwards: this can be inter-
preted as being convinced that α cannot be false and that no case against α can
succeed. This kind of non-cooperation structure is called mind closed and it is
easy to imagine such a dialogue continuing forever if P ’s mind does not change.
In the previous example, stone-walling is done by one party, P . In [51][p.181],
however, the authors define a quarrel as a reciprocal stone-walling dialogue. As
the authors remark, the quarrel model shows up frequently in actual dialogical
practice, and they suggest that this is an efficient way of playing the game of
dialectical fatigue. Dialectical fatigue settles a dispute, and declares a win for
the party whose opponent just gives up6:
Example 2. Example from [51][p.182]:
m1: Assert α (P )
m2: Reject α (O)
m3: Assert α (P )
m4: Reject α (O)
m5: . . .
mn: Assert α (P )
5In [88] it is remarked however that the case of infinite proofs is problematic and is left for
future developments.
6Though not explicitly mentioned, the notion of “dialectical fatigue” and its exploitation
by self-interested agents underpins the examples discussed in [39].
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mn+1: Perhaps you are right (O)
One may wonder what the outcome of the dialogues in Examples 1 and 2
ought to be from a computational perspective. If the traditional termination
rule is adopted, the outcome is that the proponent wins if the opponent concedes
the main claim, and the opponent wins if the proponent retracts the main claim
[75]. However, this rule can not be applied to the non-terminating Example
1. Moreover termination in Example 2 is due to fatigue of one of the players,
so that this outcome may be regarded as “non-rational”, while a “rational”
development of Example 2 would be non-terminating too. One may also observe
that the termination rule imposes that one position prevails over the other one,
while one might consider also the case where the two positions are regarded as
equally acceptable.
Besides issues concerning dialogues, multi-agent systems provide a further
case for non terminating argumentation in presence of reasoning about mutual
beliefs. In fact an agent ag1 able to reason about the beliefs of another agent
ag2, may take into account also the ability of ag2 to reason about the beliefs of
ag1 in turn, then both ag1 and ag2 may reason about the mutual beliefs about
beliefs an so on ad libitum. This kind of problem is exemplified, in a common
sense setting, by the novel by the Argentine writer Osvaldo Soriano “The longest
penalty ever” [83]. Here, in a football game, a goal keeper has to reason about
whether to dive to the left or to the right. The keeper knows that the kicker
in the past has always kicked to the right: this would be a reason to dive to
the right, but the keeper also knows the kicker knows that the keeper knows
his past records (and might therefore decide to kick to the left) and this would
be a reason to dive to the left, but in turn the kicker knows that the keeper
knows that the kicker knows . . ., and the chain of mutually attacking arguments
supporting the decision of diving to the left or to the right grows to infinity.
Of course, in a non cooperative context this growth can not be prevented by
mutual agreement and, for either agent, stopping the reasoning at a given level
represents an arbitrary, and possibly not appropriate, choice.
2.3. Reasoning with unbounded domains
Leaving apart non-terminating situations in multi-agent systems, a further
example of infinite argumentation concerns reasoning with unbounded domains
like time or space.
For instance, reactive systems are characterized by “their perpetual interac-
tion with their environment as well as their nonterminating behaviour”[55] and
as such require models able to encompass infinite objects like automata over
infinite words or infinite games. While these models are suitable to analyze
properties of these systems in a monotonic reasoning context, different issues
arise and different formalisms are needed in case some kind of nonmonotonic
reasoning is carried out.
An example of use of argumentation in a nonmonotonic open-horizon context
is provided by Pollock [74], who introduced a temporal projection principle to
address the problem of argumentation-based reasoning on “stable” properties
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of the world. Quoting Pollock “the built-in epistemic arsenal of a rational agent
must include reason-schemas of the following sort for at least some choices of
P: if t0 < t1, believing P − at− t0 is a defeasible reason for the agent to believe
P − at− t1”. To allow new information to override presumptions based on out-
of-date perceptions it is necessary that “the strength of the presumption that
a stable property will continue to hold over time decays as the time interval
increases”. Though not explicitly addressed by [74], it is straightforward to
consider a spatial version of this projection principle too. For instance if one
has a reason to believe that a certain site is highly dangerous due to pollution or
contamination, then this belief can be reasonably projected to all the neighbour
locations with strength decaying as the distance from the contaminated site
increases. The set of arguments (with different strength) that can be produced
on the basis of this kind of projection principles is, in general, unbounded. To
cope with this, in the OSCAR implementation described in [74], Pollock restricts
the use of the temporal projection principle to a specific form of backward
reasoning: the agent is interested in the value of a property at a specific time
instant t and checks whether there are reasons to believe that the property had a
certain value at an instant t0 < t. If this is the case, the reason can be projected,
with decreased strength, from t0 to t. However explicit representations of infinite
arguments are needed to go beyond this specific form of reasoning.
Formulating (defeasible) previsions on the basis of (discrete) series of past
observations is a further form of reasoning involving similar issues as the set of
possible observations is countably infinite and the set of actual observations may,
in general, grow indefinitely. To give an example, consider previsions concerning
sport events (e.g. soccer matches) based on previous performances of the teams
with defeasible rules of the kind “A team which has won the majority of past
matches will win future matches” and “A team which has lost the last three
matches will loose next match” (or more complex ones with similar structure).
Here the observation of the outcomes for a team is constantly updated after each
match giving rise to new arguments representing new previsions (possibly con-
flicting each other and with previous ones). The set of generated “previsional”
arguments is (at least in principle) infinite at each step as some of the previsions
could be projected over the set of all future matches, e.g. for a very strong team
with very long tradition one can, reasonably but defeasibly, foresee further wins
for many years to come. It can be observed that open-ended horizons of this
kind can be managed in practice by considering a finite temporal window ex-
cluding time instants which are “too far” in the past or in the future. It can be
also observed, however, that if such a temporal window is very large it can be
anyway more convenient in practice to adopt compact specification techniques
for infinite frameworks of the kind we propose in this paper rather than to deal
explicitly with all the elements of finite (but very large) sets and that, in any
case, an open-ended representation is more appropriate for reasoning concerning
long-term trends and scenarios.
As already mentioned, unbounded time horizons have been considered also
in game theory, where infinite games are meant to represent open-ended (e.g.
life-long) interactions between the players. Different kinds of infinite games can
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be considered. In iterated variable-sum non-cooperative games, like the iterated
prisoner dilemma [3], each player has a payoff at each turn and seeks strategies
maximizing the value of the infinite series of the payoffs. Quite differently, in
Gale-Stewart two-player zero-sum games, one of the two player wins depending
on the membership of the infinite sequence of the moves played by both players
to a predefined payoff set. Here a winning strategy for a player is a function for
choosing the next move which ensures the membership (or non-membership) of
the resulting infinite sequence to the payoff set. There is a potential rich inter-
play between infinite games and infinite argumentation. On one hand, infinite
argumentation frameworks can be used as an abstract model for some game-
theoretic problems and, especially thanks to their rich endowment of alternative
semantics, may suggest variants and open new perspectives for these problems,
in the same spirit as done by Dung for the stable marriage problem (see [37,
Sect. 3.2]). On the other hand existing results on infinite games may provide
a formal basis for the open investigation area on infinite argumentation games
and the relevant strategies, building on the standpoint that non-termination
does not mean necessarily indeterminacy.
2.4. Motivation summary
Summing up, it appears that investigation on infinite argumentation struc-
tures got somehow stuck in a sort of deadlock situation. From a theoretical
point of view, their fundamental role has been consistently acknowledged and
they have been universally encompassed at a definitional level, but actual for-
malisms to deal with them at an operational level, i.e. compact representations
along with computational procedures, have not been developed, possibly due to
a “lack of pressure” from the application side. In turn, the potential emergence
of infinite argumentation structures has been evidenced in a variety of applica-
tion contexts, but, possibly due to the lack of suitable operational approaches
from the theoretical side, they have generally been disregarded as problematic
or dealt with by adopting specific workarounds.
The present work contributes to overcome this situation by proposing an
approach to compact specification of infinite abstract argumentation frameworks
endowed with effective computational procedures.
The approach is suitable, in general, to describe infinite argumentation
frameworks with some kind of regular structure. This covers, in fact, the cases
of practical interest, since it corresponds to the generation of arguments (and of
the attacks between them) by some systematic non terminating mechanism, as
it may occur in a multi-agent system or in other automated reasoning contexts,
as described above. As it will be better commented later, the approach is also
suitable to manage cases where argument generation terminates but the result-
ing framework is so large to make a compact representation advantageous. Our
proposal can therefore be regarded as a novel enabling technique with respect to
the long-term goal of deploying extended argumentation-based reasoners cov-
ering also the case of infinite (or very large) frameworks. In a shorter-term
perspective, the results in this paper provide a formal basis for incorporating
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the management of infinite frameworks in existing implementations of Dung’s
style argumentation like ASPARTIX [47] or Dungine [84].
3. Background notions
3.1. Argumentation frameworks
In this section we review the elements of Dung’s abstract argumentation
frameworks [37] and the relevant semantics notions and basic computational
issues.
Definition 1. An argumentation framework (af) is defined as a pair 〈X ,A〉
in which X is a set of arguments and A ⊆ X × X describes the attack relation
between arguments in X , so that 〈x, y〉 ∈ A indicates “the argument x attacks
the argument y” (or, equivalently, “the argument y is attacked by the argument
x”).
For S ⊆ X we use the notations S− (resp. S+) to indicate
S− = { x ∈ X : ∃ y ∈ S for which 〈x, y〉 ∈ A}
S+ = { x ∈ X : ∃ y ∈ S for which 〈y, x〉 ∈ A}
The arguments in S− (resp. S+) are said to attack (resp. be attacked by) S.
When for any argument x ∈ X , the set {x}− of its attackers is finite, the
argumentation framework is said to be finitary. Formally, an af, 〈X ,A〉, is
finitary iff for each argument x ∈ X |{ y : 〈y, x〉 ∈ A}| is finite.
A subset S ⊆ X is conflict-free if no argument in S attacks another argument
in S, i.e. (S × S) ∩ A is empty. An argument x is said to be acceptable with
respect to S ⊆ X if for any y ∈ X such that 〈y, x〉 ∈ A there is some z ∈ S
for which 〈z, y〉 ∈ A, i.e. x is acceptable wrt to S if any attacker (y) of x is
counterattacked by an argument (z) of S.
The characteristic function of an af is the mapping F : 2X → 2X where
F(S) = { x ∈ X : x is acceptable wrt S}
Much of the development of afs has focused on the study of argumentation
semantics which can be regarded as refining the informal idea of “collection of
justifiable arguments in an af”. Typically this has been achieved by considering
predicates that such collections must satisfy, i.e. mappings σ : 2X → {⊤,⊥}
so that Eσ(〈X ,A〉) describes the set of subsets of X that satisfy the criteria
given by σ within the af 〈X ,A〉. A review of the many choices that have been
considered for σ may be found in Baroni and Giacomin [7].
Definition 2. Let 〈X ,A〉 be an af and S a subset of X .
a. S is admissible (denoted as S ∈ Eadm(〈X ,A〉)) if S is conflict-free and
every argument in S is acceptable wrt S, i.e. S ⊆ F(S).
b. S is a complete extension, (denoted as S ∈ Ecomp(〈X ,A〉)) if S is conflict-
free and x ∈ S if and only if x is acceptable wrt S, i.e. S = F(S).
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c. S is a preferred extension (denoted as S ∈ Epr(〈X ,A〉)) if S is a maximal
(wrt ⊆) admissible set.
d. S is a stable extension (denoted as S ∈ Estab(〈X ,A〉)) if S is conflict-free
and for any y 6∈ S, there is some x ∈ S that attacks y, i.e. S+ = X \ S.
e. S is the grounded extension of 〈X ,A〉 (denoted as S ∈ Egr(〈X ,A〉)) if it is
the (unique) least fixed point of F , i.e. S = F(S) and there is no S′ ( S
such that S′ = F(S′).
The existence and uniqueness of the grounded extension is established in
[37] for all afs.
Finally, we recall the various ways in which a given argument may relate to
these sets in an af 〈X ,A〉.
Definition 3. Let x ∈ X and σ : 2X → {⊤,⊥}. The argument x is credulously
accepted wrt σ if there is some S in Eσ(〈X ,A〉) such that x ∈ S. It is said to
be sceptically accepted wrt σ if every S in Eσ(〈X ,A〉) satisfies x ∈ S.
The concepts of credulous and sceptical acceptance, together with the var-
ious semantics that have been put forward, naturally motivate a number of
computational problems involving afs.
Definition 4. Let σ : 2X → {⊤,⊥}.
a. caσ is the decision problem whose instances, 〈〈X ,A〉, x〉, are accepted if
and only if x is credulously accepted wrt σ in 〈X ,A〉.
b. saσ is the decision problem whose instances, 〈〈X ,A〉, x〉, are accepted if
and only if x is sceptically accepted wrt σ in 〈X ,A〉.
c. verσ is the decision problem whose instances, 〈〈X ,A〉, S〉, are accepted if
and only if S ∈ Eσ(〈X ,A〉).
d. existσ is the decision problem whose instances, 〈X ,A〉, are accepted if
and only if Eσ(〈X ,A〉) 6= ∅.
e. non-emptyσ is the decision problem whose instances, 〈X ,A〉, are ac-
cepted if and only if Eσ(〈X ,A〉) 6∈ {∅, {∅}}.
As well as the decision problems described in Defn. 4 there are a range of
function (or construction) problems. We focus on that of given 〈X ,A〉 (for
which Eσ(〈X ,A〉) 6= ∅) identifying all sets S ⊆ X for which S ∈ Eσ(〈X ,A〉),
denoting this problem consσ.
For each of the semantics σ presented in Defn. 2, these computational prob-
lems have been studied in depth (within finite afs) and their general properties
are now well understood. We summarise these results in Fact 1 and Table 2.
Fact 1.
a. The function consgr is polynomial time computable, hence all of the cases
(a) though (e) of Defn. 4 are polynomial time decidable for the grounded
extension [37].
b. For σ ∈ {adm, pr, comp, gr}, existσ is trivial (i.e. it is always verified as
a consequence of well-known results).
18
c. existstab is np–complete [36] (see also [49]).
d. For σ ∈ {adm, stab, comp}, verσ is decidable in polynomial-time, how-
ever verpr is conp–complete [36].
e. For σ ∈ {adm, pr, stab, comp}, caσ is np–complete [36].
f. saσ is trivial for σ = adm , polynomial for σ = comp, conp–complete for
σ = stab7, and Πp2–complete for σ = pr [41].
g. non-emptyσ is np–complete for σ ∈ {adm, pr, comp, stab} [36].
σ =adm σ =pr σ =comp σ =stab σ =gr
existσ trivial trivial trivial np–complete trivial
verσ polynomial conp–complete polynomial polynomial polynomial
caσ np–complete np–complete np–complete np–complete polynomial
saσ trivial Π
p
2 polynomial conp–complete polynomial
non-emptyσ np–complete np–complete np–complete np–complete polynomial
Table 2: Computational problems in finite afs.
We emphasise that the classifications in Fact 1 are with respect to finite
afs. For a more detailed summary of complexity and algorithms within af
semantics we refer the reader to the overview of Dunne and Wooldridge [44];
complexity-theoretic treatments of both novel semantics and developments of
Dung’s original proposals may be found in, among others, [6, 46, 40, 43, 45].
3.2. Formal languages
As to the required background on formal languages, which will be heavily
used in the paper, we assume that the reader is familiar with the standard
concepts and basic results in the field (to make the paper self-contained the
necessary ones are provided in Appendix A). We recall only the basic definitions
in this section, in order to introduce the reader to the notation used in the sequel
of the paper.
Definition 5. An alphabet is a finite set of symbols. For an arbitrary alphabet,
the notation Σ = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} will be used. A word, w, over an alphabet
Σ is a finite sequence, w = wi1wi2 · · ·wir of symbols from Σ. The set of all
possible words is denoted as Σ∗. The length, |w|, of w ∈ Σ∗ is the total number
of symbols occuring in its definition. The word of length 0 in Σ∗ is called the
empty word and is denoted as ε.
For u = ui1 · · ·uir and v = vj1 · · · vjs words in Σ
∗ the word w ∈ Σ∗ formed
by concatenating u with v (denoted u ·v) is the word ui1 . . . uir vj1 . . . vjs whose
length is |u|+ |v| = r + s. For any u ∈ Σ∗, u · ε = ε · u = u, i.e. ε is an identity
element in Σ∗ with respect to the operation · of concatenation.
7Note, however, the caveat raised in [44].
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Definition 6. A language, L, over an alphabet Σ, is a subset of Σ∗. For
languages L1 and L2 we define languages L1 ∪ L2, L1 ∩ L2, and L1 \ L2 in the
obvious way so that the operations {∪,∩, \} are the standard set-theoretic ones.
In addition, specific to languages,
L1 · L2 = {u · v : u ∈ L1, v ∈ L2}
L = {u : u ∈ Σ∗, u 6∈ L}
L∗ = ∪∞k=0 { w : w = u1 · u2 · · ·uk, ui ∈ L}
L1/L2 = { u : ∃ v ∈ L2 s.t. u · v ∈ L1}
rev(L) = { σ1σ2 · · ·σm−1σm : σmσm−1 · · ·σ2σ1 ∈ L}
The language L∗ is sometimes referred to as the Kleene closure (or ∗-closure)
of L, while L1/L2 is called the quotient of L1 wrt L2.
8
Definition 7. A language L ⊆ Σ∗ is a regular language if L satisfies any of the
following requirements:
R1. L = ∅ or L = {ε} or L = {σ} for any σ ∈ Σ.
R2. L = L1 ∪ L2 where L1 and L2 are regular languages.
R3. L = L1 · L2 where L1 and L2 are regular languages.
R4. L = (L1)
∗ where L1 is a regular language.
Definition 8. A formal grammar is defined via a 4-tuple, 〈Σ, V, P, S〉 where
Σ = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σn} is a finite alphabet of terminal symbols ; V = {V1, . . . , Vm} a
finite set of variable symbols, P is a finite set of production rules, {p1, p2, . . . , pr}
of the form pi : αi → βi where αi ∈ (V ∪Σ)∗ \Σ∗ and βi ∈ (V ∪Σ)∗ and S ∈ V
is the start symbol. The language generated (see Appendix A)) by a grammar
G is denoted as L(G).
Definition 9. A deterministic finite automaton (dfa) is defined via a 5-tuple,
M = 〈Σ, Q, q0, F, δ〉 where Σ = {σ1, . . . , σk} is a finite set of input symbols,
Q = {q0, q1, . . . , qm} a finite set of states ; q0 ∈ Q the initial state; F ⊆ Q the set
of accepting states; and δ : Q×Σ → Q the state transition function. A word
w = wnwn−1 . . . w1 ∈ Σ∗ is accepted by the dfa 〈Σ, Q, q0, F, δ〉 if the sequence of
states qi1qi2 . . . qin consistent with the state transition function δ which processes
every symbol in w, i.e. satisfying qi1 = δ(q0, w1) and qij = δ(qij−1 , wj) for each
2 ≤ j ≤ n, has qin ∈ F . For a dfa, M = 〈Σ, Q, q0, F, δ〉, L(M) is the subset of
Σ∗ accepted by M .
8Some authors distinguish so-called left and right quotients of L1 wrt L2, the latter being
L1/L2 (as given in the definition), the former { u : ∃v ∈ L1 s.t. v · u ∈ L2}. We use only
the notion of (right) quotient.
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4. Formalism requirements and weaknesses of naive representations
Given the goal of investigating novel approaches to deal with argumentation
frameworks with a countably infinite set of arguments, we need to establish
some basic criteria to evaluate the approaches themselves.
A first basic criterion is expressiveness, namely the ability to encompass the
description of a sufficiently large variety of infinite argumentation frameworks
so as to cover those cases which are meaningful from a theoretical or practical
perspective. These include in particular the cases of infinite argumentation
frameworks already considered in the literature.
A second criterion is tractability: the use of the formalism should not raise
intractable computational problems making it impractical. In particular, we
have to notice the arousal of a problem not occurring in the finite case: given
that an argumentation framework 〈X ,A〉 involving infinite sets can only be
given through a finite encoding η(〈X ,A〉), it must be validated that an encoding
η(〈X ,A〉) is indeed a valid description of some af.
Further, computational requirements related to the basic decision problems
listed in Definition 4 have to be taken into account. A third criterion is there-
fore closure wrt set-theoretical operations, as they are involved in the definition
and/or characterization of the fundamental properties in argumentation seman-
tics and hence in the relevant decision procedures. To exemplify, testing whether
a set of arguments is conflict-free corresponds to test whether the intersection
between this set and the set of its attackers is empty. Hence, given the specifi-
cation of two infinite sets of arguments in a formalism, the specification of their
intersection should be captured (and, hopefully, be easily constructable) within
the same formalism.
In the view of satisfying the above requirements, a standard approach to the
problem of representing an infinite collection of objects via a finite specification
is to exploit formal grammars and their associated machine models9.
In this context, we now consider and criticize a rather straightforward ap-
proach one might adopt in describing 〈X ,A〉 where the supporting set of argu-
ments is an infinite, but enumerable, set. The idea, introduced in Definition 10
consists in describing the attack relation with a language referring to indexes in
the argument enumeration.
Definition 10. Let X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn, . . .} be a countably infinite set of
atomic arguments. A subset A ⊆ X × X is naively encoded if described as the
language LA over the two symbol alphabet {0, 1} for which
LA = {0
i · 1 · 0j : 〈xi, xj〉 ∈ A}
Thus the naive encoding of a set of attacks uses a unary10 form to describe
the (indices) of the source and destination arguments involved in the attack
9Considering other possible choices of formal tools for the specification of infinite structures
is beyond the scope of the present paper and is left for future work.
10We could, of course, use an arbitrary number base, however, to do so adds nothing in the
way of expressive power and can, in fact, reduce this considerably.
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with the symbol 1 used to separate these two components (in the absence of
any attack LA = ∅).
For naive encodings one can consider formal grammars and their associated
languages as a means of presenting a finite specification of 〈X ,A〉, i.e. as a
grammar G over alphabet {0, 1} for which L(G) = LA. We show (proofs are
given in Appendix B.1) that different choices for the family of grammars G
belongs to lead invariably to the violation of (at least) one of the three criteria
above, making this approach unsuitable in spite of its apparent simplicity.
We start with an unsurprising property of naive encodings.
Proposition 1. For X as introduced in Definition 10, there are choices of
A ⊆ X × X such that there is no formal grammar, G with L(G) = LA ⊆
{0i · 1 · 0j : i, j ≥ 1}.
The issue of infinite attack structures which cannot be described within naive
encodings may, justifiably, be seen as a purely technical limitation as far as the
families of afs so affected are unlikely to feature in applications (see the proof
of Proposition 1). It turns out however that, for unrestricted grammars, the
criterion of tractability is not satisfied since the problem of determining if a
naive encoding does indeed describe some af is not semi-decidable.
Proposition 2. Given an arbitrary (i.e. unrestricted) grammar G over the
alphabet {0, 1} the problem of determining if L(G) ⊆ {0i ·1·0j : i, j ≥ 1} is not
semi-decidable, i.e. there is no TM program which given (a description of) G as
input halts and accepts precisely those G for which L(G) ⊆ {0i·1·0j : i, j ≥ 1}.
In fact, results analogous to Proposition 2 continue to hold even if we use
the less expressive class of context-sensitive grammars.
Proposition 3. Given an arbitrary context-sensitive grammar, G, over the
alphabet {0, 1} the problem of determining if L(G) ⊆ {0i · 1 · 0j : i, j ≥ 1} is
not semi-decidable.
The problem evidenced in Propositions 2 and 3 does not hold when consid-
ering context-free languages.
Proposition 4. Given an arbitrary context-free grammar (cfg), G, over the
alphabet {0, 1} the problem of determining if L(G) ⊆ {0i · 1 · 0j : i, j ≥ 1} is
decidable.
Context-free languages, however, do not satisfy the property of closure: it
is well-known that they are not closed under intersection, complement and set
difference.
Turning to regular languages, as with the context-free case one can decide
if a given dfa accepts the naive encoding of some 〈X ,A〉.
Proposition 5. Given M = 〈Q, {0, 1}, q0, F, δ〉 a dfa over the alphabet {0, 1}
there is a polynomial (in |Q|) algorithm that decides L(M) ⊆ {0i ·1 ·0j : i, j ≥
1}.
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Moreover, regular languages are fully satisfactory as far as closure properties
are concerned (see Appendix A Fact 6). Unfortunately, however, they feature
very limited expressive power in terms of describing naive encodings.
Proposition 6. Let L be any subset of {0i ·1 ·0j : i, j ≥ 1} with the following
property: there are infinitely many values of k such that {0k · 1 · 0m : m ≥
1}∩L 6= ∅ and for all 0n · 1 · 0m ∈ L, n ≤ m. Then L is not a regular language.
Notice that one consequence of Proposition 6 is that the naive encoding of
the infinite af whose only attacks are self-attacks, i.e. 〈p, p〉 for all p ∈ X fails
to be a regular language.11
In summary, although naive representations have an appealing structural
simplicity, if adopted one has to contend with issues of undecidability (for the
most expressive grammar classes), lack of closure (for context-free languages)
or limited expressiveness (for regular languages).
5. A Generic Regular Expression Formalism and its Properties
The issues identified with so-called naive representations in the preceding
section largely stem from the following fact: given that encodings of arguments,
pi ∈ X are effectively achieved for free – that is, for all natural numbers k,
pk ∈ X and no further analysis is needed – the task of describing 〈X ,A〉 comes
down to describing the (infinite) set A. In assuming that pk ∈ X for any
k, however, this severely limits the extent to which A can be described in a
computationally useful manner.
In this section we present an alternative method for describing infinite afs,
〈X ,A〉. The basic idea is that, rather than assuming X is understood simply
as {p1, p2, . . . , pn, . . .}, we consider arguments in X to be specified so that there
is some structural aspect linking them. In this way we can then present very
general specifications of the attack structure that are conditioned solely in terms
of the specific arguments in X .
In a nutshell, the proposal consists of two basic elements: a description
of the (infinite) set of arguments through an appropriate argument encoding
relying on some finite automaton, and a description of the attack relations
linking arguments together through an attack expression. More precisely, the
attack expression specifies a mapping between regular expressions describing
sets of arguments, with the intended meaning that the set S is attacked by the
elements of the set obtained from S through the mapping. The combination of
the automaton describing the set of arguments and of the attack expression will
be called the af specification.
Example 3. To illustrate our approach we will use some “simple” infinite struc-
tures, which can be regarded as basic patterns, possibly to be reused in the con-
text of more articulated infinite argumentation frameworks. A first example of
11This language, {0m · 1 · 0m : m ≥ 1} is, however, context-free.
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0k+1 , Ak+1
0k , Ak
000 , A3
00 , A2
0 , A1
(a)
0k+1 , Ak+1
0k , Ak
000 , A3
00 , A2
0 , A1
(b)
Figure 1: Two infinite attack chains: AFD (a), and AFU (b).
basic structure (related to endless debates, or “chiken and egg” style dilemmas,
or the kicker and goalkeeper example) is an infinite sequence of arguments linked
by the attack relation. We note that this kind of structure admits two differ-
ent instantiations: one where the sequence “starts” with an attacked argument
(which corresponds to the examples mentioned above) and a dual one where the
sequence “starts” with an attacking argument. They correspond respectively to
the argumentation frameworks AFD and AFU (see Figure 1) defined as follows:
AFD = 〈X ,AD〉 with X = {A1, A2, . . . , An, . . .} and AD = {〈Ai+1, Ai〉 : i ≥ 1}
and AFU = 〈X ,AU 〉 with X as above and AU = {〈Ai, Ai+1〉 : i ≥ 1}. An-
other example of basic structure, related to temporal projection, is a couple
of “parallel” sequences of arguments where corresponding arguments in the se-
quences mutually attack each other. This kind of structure may correspond
to conflicting information acquired at the same time for the same entity (e.g.
a physical quantity) from two different and equally reliable sources A and B
(e.g. two different experiments or measurements). The conflict between the
initial arguments corresponding to the readings from the two sources is then
projected over time. This can be represented by the argumentation framework
AFM = 〈XM ,AM 〉 with XM = {A1, A2, . . . , An, . . .}∪ {B1, B2, . . . , Bn, . . .} and
AM = {〈Ai, Bi〉 : i ≥ 1} ∪ {〈Bi, Ai〉 : i ≥ 1} (see Figure 2(a)). To pro-
vide a slightly more complicated structure, we will consider also a variant of
this temporal projection situation, with a third source C which is in agree-
ment with the source A and is considered more reliable than A and B. This
can be represented by the argumentation framework AFR = 〈XR,AR〉 with
XR = {A1, A2, . . . , An, . . .} ∪ {B1, B2, . . . , Bn, . . .} ∪ {C1, C2, . . . , Cn, . . .} and
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AR = {〈Ai, Bi〉 : i ≥ 1} ∪ {〈Bi, Ai〉 : i ≥ 1} ∪ {〈Ci, Bi〉 : i ≥ 1} (see Figure
2(b)).
0 , A1
000 , A2 0000 , B2
0 · · · 0 , Ak 00 · · ·0 , Bk
00 , B1
(a)
0 , A1 00 , B1 000 , C1
0000 , A2 00000 , B2 000000 , C2
0 · · · 0 , Ak 00 · · · 0 , Bk 000 · · ·0 , Ck
(b)
Figure 2: Two infinite argumentation frameworks: AFM (a), and AFR (b).
5.1. Argument encoding
Central to our formalism is the notion of “argument encoding” as a given
set of words over some base set of symbols.
Definition 11. Let Σ = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} be an alphabet. An argument en-
coding over Σ is any regular language X ⊆ Σ∗ \ {ε}.
Thus a (possibly infinite) set of arguments, X , corresponds to some regular
language over a finite alphabet Σ.
Example 3 (continued). The notion of argument encoding is very general and,
in fact, leaves completely open the choice of the alphabet and of the regular
language to be adopted to represent a given infinite structure. Considering the
frameworks AFD and AFU , featuring a simple “linear” structure, the straight-
forward choice we will follow uses an alphabet consisting of a unique symbol,
actually Σ = {0}, and the regular language 0 · 0∗, by adopting the correspon-
dence 0i , Ai. For frameworks with more articulated structures like AFM and
AFR, one might consider using an alphabet with a symbol for each class of
arguments, e.g. ΣM = {0, 1} and ΣR = {0, 1, 2}. Accordingly the regular lan-
guages to encode XM and XR would be 0 · 0∗ ∪ 1 · 1∗ and 0 · 0∗ ∪ 1 · 1∗ ∪ 2 · 2∗
respectively, with the correspondences 0i , Ai, 1
i , Bi, 2
i , Ci. As we will see
later, however, a different approach will be adopted since it is more suitable for
the purpose of representation of the attack relation. In fact, we will use again
the alphabet Σ = {0}, and the regular language 0 ·0∗ for all arguments, putting
the different classes of arguments in correspondence with distinct sublanguages
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of 0 · 0∗. In fact for AFM we will adopt the correspondence 0 · (00)i , Ai+1 and
00 · (00)i , Bi+1 for i ≥ 0, i.e. 0 , A1, 00 , B1, 000 , A2, 0000 , B2 and
so on. Similarly for AFR we will adopt the correspondence 0 · (000)i , Ai+1,
00 · (000)i , Bi+1 and 000 · (000)i , Ci+1for i ≥ 0.
5.2. Attack expression
The increased expressivity and computational effectiveness of our approach
(in comparison to naive encodings), derives from the mechanism used to describe
sets of attacks. We seek to develop formalisms by which the set of arguments (in
X ) that “attack” in the standard sense of [37] some specified subset S ⊆ X may
be presented, i.e. for defining “suitable” functions µ : 2X → 2X , such that,
for a given set of arguments S, µ(S) specifies the set of arguments attacking
S, i.e. µ(S) = S−. By “suitable” we recognise that there are certain natural
conditions that such functions ought to respect.
Definition 12. A mapping µ : 2Σ
∗
→ 2Σ
∗
is reasonable if
R1. ∀S ⊆ Σ∗, µ(S) =
⋃
u∈S µ({u}). (Additivity)
R2. ∀S ⊆ Σ∗ for which S is a regular language, µ(S) is a regular language.
(Closure)
In addition, we say that a reasonable mapping is invertible if the function
ν : 2Σ
∗
→ 2Σ
∗
defined via
ν(S) = {u ∈ Σ∗ : ∃ v ∈ S s.t. v ∈ µ({u})}
is in turn a reasonable mapping. It is easy to see that ν satisfies property R1
by definition.
We observe that all of these conditions hold for the finite instantiations of
A in Dung’s afs. For the development we consider to infinite X , the additivity
restriction states that attacks on S must be associated with individual argu-
ments in S and not with S as a whole, i.e. we can construct the set of attacks
on S simply by considering attacks on the members of S in turn.12 It may be
noted that additivity implies that the mapping is also monotonic, i.e. if R ⊆ S
then µ(R) ⊆ µ(S). Thus additive mappings reflect the natural condition that
attacks on a set of arguments, S, cannot be eliminated simply by adding more
arguments to S: notice that by disallowing explicit removal of an attack on a
set (in the definition of µ) we require defences to attacks to be made by direct
counterattacks. In this way we preserve the concept of “u is acceptable to S”
by identifying any v ∈ S such that v ∈ µ({x}) for each x ∈ µ({u}).
While the additivity may be justified through semantic considerations, our
reason for imposing “closure wrt regular languages” is motivated by compu-
tational concerns: given that S ⊆ X (if regular) has a simple computational
12We note, however, that settings with attack relations not respecting additivity have been
examined in the context of finite frameworks, e.g. Nielsen and Parsons [69] and Bochmann [20].
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representation (e.g. as a dfa accepting exactly the arguments in S) it is desir-
able that subsets of X “related to” S, e.g. through the property of attacking
its members, can also be so described. In principle this allows for the outcome
of µ(S) to be described as a dfa.
Finally the concept of invertibility addresses issues arising with the “inverse”
mapping: just as µ : 2X → 2X describes the subset of X that attacks a given
S ⊆ X , so ν : 2X → 2X describes the subset of X that is attacked by S. The
justification of additivity and closure properties is on similar grounds to those
used with µ.
Given the basic desiderata that mappings defining attacks ought to satisfy
stated in Definition 12, we now turn to the issue of how general functions sat-
isfying these desiderata can be constructed. For this purpose we introduce the
concept of attack expressions over a finite alphabet Σ.
Definition 13. A well-formed attack expression (ae) over Σ is a sentence con-
structed by the following rules.
1. For all σi ∈ Σ, σi is an attack expression over Σ.
2. The symbol I (for identity) is an attack expression over Σ.
3. If p and q are two attack expressions over Σ then p ∪ q is also an attack
expression over Σ.
4. If p is an attack expression and KΣ is a regular expression (using the
operations {+, ·, ∗}) over only symbols from Σ (i.e. the identity symbol I
does not occur in KΣ) then all of KΣ · p, p ·KΣ, p/KΣ, KΣ/p and p∩KΣ
are attack expressions.
5. If p is an attack expression over Σ then (p) and γ(p) for γ ∈ {hd, tl} are
attack expressions over Σ.
6. The only attack expressions over Σ are those formed by a finite number
of applications of (1) through (5).
Let AE(Σ) denote the set of all well-formed attack expressions over Σ and for
a ∈ AE(Σ) let size(a) denote the number of operations (i.e. applications of rules
3–5) used to define a. The key motivation for this formalism is in describing the
attack structure relating a set of arguments. Hence each a ∈ AE(Σ), defines a
mapping a : 2Σ
∗
→ 2Σ
∗
as follows
Definition 14. Let p ∈ AE(Σ) and S ⊆ Σ∗, the set p(S) is given by the rules
below:
p(S) =


{σi} if p = σi
S if p = I
(b(S) ∪ c(S)) if p = (b ∪ c)
KΣ · b(S) if p = KΣ · b
b(S) ·KΣ if p = b ·KΣ
b(S)/KΣ if p = b/KΣ
KΣ/b(S) if p = KΣ/b
b(S) ∩KΣ if p = b ∩KΣ
γ(b(S)) if p = γ(b)
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The unary operations – {hd, tl} – are defined as follows for S ⊆ Σ∗:
hd(S) = { σi ∈ Σ : ∃w s.t. σi · w ∈ S}
tl(S) = { w : ∃ σi ∈ Σ s.t. σi · w ∈ S}
Note that tl({σ}) = {ε} and tl(∅) = hd({ε}) = hd(∅) = ∅.
Before analysing the properties of the proposed attack expressions, we com-
ment on the set of operations – {∪, ·KΣ, KΣ·, /KΣ, KΣ/, ∩KΣ, hd, tl} that
are provided. In particular we note the limited way in which · and ∩ may be
used and the absence of complement and Kleene ∗ operators, despite the fact
that regular languages are closed under the last two of these. The immediate
problem with allowing arbitrary usage of · and ∩ concerns the fact that, for
expressions such as p · q or p∩ q we cannot, in general, guarantee that the map-
pings p ·q or p∩q are additive. For example, suppose that p = q = I, Σ = {0, 1}
and S = {0k : k ≥ 1}. Then (p · q)(S) = S \ {0}, however⋃
w∈S
(p · q)({w}) = {02k : k ≥ 1} 6= S \ {0}
Similarly if p = I, q = tl(I), S = {1k : k ≥ 1} ∪ {0 · 1k : k ≥ 1} we get
(p ∩ q)(S) = S ∩ tl(S) = {1k : k ≥ 1}
but⋃
w∈S
(p ∩ q)({w}) =
⋃
w∈S
p({w}) ∩ q({w}) =
⋃
w∈S
({w} ∩ {tl(w)}) = ∅
We could, of course, avoid this by directly defining µ(S) to be
⋃
w∈S µ({w}),
i.e. restricting the domain of µ to Σ∗. In this case, however, we cannot always
ensure that p · q preserves regularity. For example, using p = I, q = {1} · I with
S = {0k : k ≥ 1} (which is a regular language),⋃
w∈S
p(w) · q(w) = {0k · 1 · 0k : k ≥ 1}
is not regular. This behaviour arises since regular languages are not closed under
unbounded union (only with respect to finite union). The issues underpinning
the absence of · from the class of allowed operations are easily seen also to arise
were ∗ to be added. Finally allowing complementation would lead to mappings
which were not monotonic (and thus could not be additive).
Theorem 1 provides a first confirmation of the soundness of the proposed
approach by showing13 that the mappings arising via attack expressions have
appropriate properties.
Theorem 1. Let p ∈ AE(Σ) be any attack expression over Σ. The mapping
p : 2Σ
∗
→ 2Σ
∗
is reasonable.
13The proofs relevant to this section are given in Appendix B.2.
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5.3. af specification
We now have the basic elements of our formal descriptive mechanism for
infinite frameworks, the idea being that the set of arguments is specified as a
regular language X ⊆ Σ∗ and the attack relation is specified through an attack
expression a. In fact, given an element v of X the set T of attackers of v might
be defined as T = a({v}). Considering now a set S ⊆ X , the set of attackers
of S is given by {v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃ u ∈ S s.t. v ∈ a({u})} which is equal to a(S) by
additivity of a. However, it should be noted that while the attack relation must
be a subset of X × X , it might be the case that for some S ⊆ X a(S) * X . To
fix this (actually minor) problem we need to introduce some further notation.
Definition 15. Let µ : 2Σ
∗
→ 2Σ
∗
and X ⊆ Σ∗ a regular language, we define
µX : 2
X → 2X as
µX (S) = µ(S) ∩ X
Proposition 7 shows that considering µX instead of µ does not affect the
property of being a reasonable mapping.
Proposition 7. If µ is a reasonable mapping over the domain 2Σ
∗
then µX is
a reasonable mapping over the domain 2X .
We can now formally introduce the notion of af specification.
Definition 16. Let Σ be a finite alphabet of symbols and X ⊆ Σ∗ be a regular
language. An af specification (afs) is a pair 〈M, a〉 whereM = 〈Q,Σ, q0, δ, F 〉
is some finite automaton14 for which L(M) = X and a ∈ AE(Σ) is a well-formed
attack expression over Σ. Given an afs 〈M, a〉, the relation →a over X × X
is defined by u →a v (read as “v is attacked by u”) if u ∈ aX ({v}). We call
〈X ,→a〉 the argumentation framework induced by 〈M, a〉.
Note that, given an af specification and a set S ⊆ X , the set of attackers of
S denoted as pi−a (S) , { v ∈ Σ
∗ : ∃ u ∈ S s.t. v →a u} is equal to aX (S), by
additivity.
Example 3 (continued). Continuing with the examples, we can now complete
the specification of AFU , AFD, AFM and AFR by identifying the relevant attack
expressions.
As to AFU we note that, for a generic i ≥ 2 the argument (corresponding to)
0i is attacked by the argument 0i−1, leading to the attack expression a = tl(I).
Note that a({0}) = {ε} but aX ({0}) = ∅. On the other hand, in AFD, for a
generic i ≥ 1, the argument 0i is attacked by the argument 0i+1, leading to the
attack expression I · 0.15
AFM requires a more articulated attack expression. Here each argument Ai
corresponding to 0 · (00)i−1 is attacked by the argument Bi corresponding to
14We do not require that M be limited to a specific class of automata since there is no
expressive gain in imposing such a restriction (see Fact 5 in Appendix A).
15Of course, we could equally write 0 · I in this case.
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00 · (00)i−1 and viceversa each argument Bi is attacked by the argument Ai.
As to the attacks from a generic Bi to a generic Ai we note that the attacker
can simply be obtained by adding a trailing 0. We can not however use the
simple expression I · 0 as above since this would entail not only that any Ai
is attacked by Bi but also that any Bi is attacked by Ai+1 which is not the
case. The attack expression has therefore to specify that the trailing 0 applies
only to the elements of the sublanguage 0 · (00)∗, giving rise to the expression
(I∩(0 ·(00)∗)) ·0. Similarly, the attacks from a generic Ai to a generic Bi can be
obtained using the tl operator and properly restricting its application, giving rise
to tl(I∩((00)·(00)∗)). The complete attack expression of AFM is obtained by the
union of the two expressions above: aM = ((I∩(0·(00)∗))·0)∪tl(I∩((00)·(00)∗)).
As to AFR, we note first that the attacks between arguments Ai and Bi
are analogous to the case of AFM with the difference that Ai corresponds to
0 · (000)i−1 and Bi corresponds to 00 · (000)i−1. Hence, similarly to above, we
obtain the expressions (I ∩ (0 · (000)∗)) · 0 and tl(I ∩ ((00) · (000)∗)). As to the
attacks from an argument Ci, corresponding to 000 · (000)i−1, to an argument
Bi corresponding to 00 · (000)i−1 we note that they can again be represented
through the addition of a trailing 0 yielding (I ∩ (00 · (000)∗)) · 0. The complete
attack expression of AFR turns out to be aR = ((I ∩ (0 · (000)∗)) · 0) ∪ (tl(I ∩
((00) · (000)∗))) ∪ ((I ∩ (00 · (000)∗)) · 0).
As a further remark, we note that the attack expression I captures the case
of an argumentation framework where each argument attacks itself (and only
itself) which has been shown not to be representable in the naive approach using
regular languages in Section 4.
5.4. Inverting the attack expression
Definition 16 provides a formal specification of the attackers of an element
(subset) of Σ∗. However it is useful to consider also the specification of the
arguments attacked by a given element (subset) of Σ∗. This is possible since
the function a is invertible as shown below by Theorem 2. In particular, the
proof of the theorem (see Appendix B.2) allows one to construct from a given
a ∈ AE(Σ) a related expression a+ with the property that for all u, v ∈ Σ∗,
u ∈ a({v}) if and only if v ∈ a+({u}). The expressions a+ use the same basic
elements as AE(Σ) plus the rev() operator16, which does not affect any of the
desired properties.
The following properties, shown to be valid in the proof of Theorem 2, pro-
vide the basic elements to derive the expressions a+ from a.
Fact 2.
1. If a = σi then a
+(S) = tl(I ∩ σi) · Σ∗; If a = I then a+(S) = S.
2. If a = b ∪ c, then a+(S) = b+(S) ∪ c+(S).
16With a little abuse of notation, in order to simplify the presentation, we will apply the
rev() operator also to single words, i.e. for w ∈ Σ∗ and {w′} = rev({w}), rev(w) = w′.
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3. If a = b ·KΣ, then a+(S) = b
+(S/KΣ).
4. If a = KΣ · b, then a+(S) = b
+(rev(rev(S)/rev(KΣ))).
5. If a = b/KΣ, then a
+(S) = b+(S ·KΣ).
6. If a = KΣ/b, then a
+(S) = b+(rev(rev(KΣ)/rev(S))).
7. If a = b ∩KΣ, then a+(S) = b
+(S ∩KΣ).
8. If a = hd(b), then a+(S) = b+(((S ∩ Σ) · Σ∗)).
9. If a = tl(b), then a+(S) = b+(Σ · S).
Theorem 2. Let 〈M, a〉 be an afs with L(M) = X and a ∈ AE(Σ). The
mapping a+ : 2Σ
∗
→ 2Σ
∗
, defined as a+(S) = { v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃ u ∈ S s.t. u ∈ a(v)}
is closed wrt regular languages.
It remains now to show that the inverse of an attack expression actually
provides the set of the arguments attacked by a set.
Proposition 8. Let 〈M, a〉 be an afs with L(M) = X and a ∈ AE(Σ). Define
the mapping, pi+a : 2
X → 2X by
pi+a (S) = { v ∈ X : ∃ u ∈ S s.t. u→a v}
It holds that pi+a (S) = a
+
X (S).
By Theorem 2 and the regularity of X it is easy to see that pi+a is additive
and preserves regularity.
Example 3 (continued). Completing our example, we can now derive the map-
ping pi+a for AFU , AFD, AFM and AFR.
As to AFU from the attack expression tl(I) applying Fact 2.9 (and 2.1 for I)
we get a+(S) = I(Σ ·S) = Σ ·S = 0 ·S. As to AFD, from the attack expression
I · 0 applying Fact 2.3 (and 2.1 for I) we get a+(S) = I(S/0) = S/0 which (in
view of S ⊆ 0 · 0∗) is equivalent to tl(S).
As to AFM , given the attack expression aM = ((I∩(0·(00)∗))·0)∪tl(I∩((00)·
(00)∗)) by Fact 2.2 we can examine separately the two terms b = ((I∩(0·(00)∗))·
0) and c = tl(I∩ ((00) · (00)∗)). As to b+, from 2.3 we get d+(S/0) with d = (I∩
(0 · (00)∗)). Applying then 2.7 (and 2.1 for I) we get b+(S) = (S/0)∩ (0 · (00)∗).
As to c+, from Fact 2.9 we get e+(Σ·S) with e = I∩((00)·(00)∗). Applying again
2.7 and 2.1 and taking into account Σ = {0} we get c+(S) = (0·S)∩((00)·(00)∗).
Summing up aM
+(S) = ((S/0) ∩ (0 · (00)∗)) ∪ ((0 · S) ∩ ((00) · (00)∗)).
The case of AFR is analogous, yielding aR
+(S) = ((S/0)∩ (0 · (000)∗))∪ ((0 ·
S) ∩ ((00) · (000)∗)) ∪ ((S/0) ∩ (00 · (000)∗)).
5.5. Representation of finite afs and combination of af specifications
The previous sections show how the proposed af specification mechanism
can deal with (up to now simple) infinite frameworks. One may then wonder
whether this mechanism is suitable to describe finite afs as well or its structure
is somehow bounded to the infinite case. In fact this problem does not arise:
any finite af 〈X ,A〉 can be easily described via the mechanisms proposed in this
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paper. Noting that X is finite simply choose Σ = X as the underlying alphabet,
and let M be the trivial associated automaton. The set A is a finite subset of
Σ×Σ and treated directly as a regular language LA = {x ·y : 〈x, y〉 ∈ A}. We
then have a ∈ AE(Σ) specified by a = hd((Σ · I)∩LA), giving pi−a (S) = hd((Σ ·
S) ∩ LA) and (after some manipulation) pi
+
a (S) = tl((S · Σ) ∩ LA).
For example if X = {w, x, y, z} and A = {〈w, x〉, 〈x, y〉, 〈y, z〉, 〈z, w〉} then
LA = {wx, xy, yz, zw} with, for example,
pi−a ({w, y}) = hd(({w, x, y, z} · {w, y}) ∩ {wx, xy, yz, zw})
= hd({ww,wy, xw, xy, yw, yy, zw, zy} ∩ {wx, xy, yz, zw})
= hd({xy, zw}) = {x, z}
pi+a ({w, y}) = tl(({w, y} · {w, x, y, z}) ∩ {wx, xy, yz, zw})
= tl({ww, yw,wx, yx, wy, yy, wz, yz} ∩ {wx, xy, yz, zw})
= tl({wx, yz}) = {x, z}
Having shown that finite afs do not raise, per se any expressiveness concern,
a further important question has to be addressed: one may wonder whether it
is possible to give the specification of an af resulting from the combination
of a finite subframework with one or more infinite subframeworks, with the
different subframeworks linked together by finite attack relations. This kind of
combined specification is particularly relevant in practice. To have an example,
consider again the frameworks AFM and AFR, concerning cases of temporal
projection with initial information acquired from different sources at the same
time. Clearly, one has also to cover the case where information is acquired
from different sources at different times. As a very simple example, consider
a slight modification of the situation represented by AFR, so that information
from the third more reliable source, C, is acquired with some delay (to keep
things simple, let say one time instant later) wrt the information from sources
A and B. This situation could be represented with a framework composed by
two subframeworks, a finite one, consisting of two mutually attacking arguments
corresponding to the information initially acquired fromA and B, and an infinite
one, with the same structure as AFR. More generally, frameworks with this kind
of structure correspond to cases where a reasoning (or dialogue) process enters a
non terminating iterative behavior after some initial non iterative steps, which
is clearly a more general (and possibly more common) situation wrt the cases
of “iterative behavior from the beginning” we have considered in our simple
illustrative examples. We will now show how this kind of structure can be
captured in our formalism.
Let AF0 = 〈X0,A0〉 a finite af and AF1 = 〈X1,A1〉, . . . , AFn = 〈Xn,An〉 a
finite sequence of infinite frameworks with specifications 〈M1, a1〉, . . . , 〈Mn, an〉
such that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n L(Mi) = Xi ⊆ Σ∗i and ai ∈ AE(Σi).
Letting Σ0 = X0 we assume without loss of generality that the alphabets
used for the different frameworks are pairwise disjoint namely, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
0 ≤ j ≤ n, i 6= j, Σi ∩ Σj = ∅.
Consider now the problem of specifying a framework AF∪ = 〈X∪,A∪〉 with
the following structure:
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• X∪ =
⋃
i∈{0,...,n} Xi;
• A∪ =
⋃
i∈{0,...,n}Ai∪
⋃
i,j∈{0,...,n},i6=j Ai,j , where Ai,j is an arbitrary finite
subset of Xi ×Xj .
In words, AF∪ includes all the subframeworks AF0, . . . AFn with their “in-
ternal” attack relations A0, . . .An plus new arbitrary finite attack relations Ai,j
linking each pair of subframeworks and representing the additional attacks from
elements of Xi to elements of Xj .
The question is now how to derive the specification of AF∪ from the speci-
fications of the subframeworks AF0, . . . AFn and from the new attacks Ai,j . As
to the reference alphabet, clearly Σ∪ =
⋃
i∈{0,...,n}Σi. Thanks to the hypothesis
of disjointness of the alphabets Σi, we know that also the sets of arguments Xi
are disjoint and we can safely define X∪ =
⋃
i∈{0,...,n} Xi. As X∪ is the union
of a set of regular languages it is a regular language too (Fact 4, Appendix A),
whose automaton M∪ can be effectively derived from the automata Mi (Fact
6.b, Appendix A).
As to the attack expression, it has to preserve, in the new framework, the
attack relations A0, . . .An of all the subframeworks and include the new attacks
Ai,j .
As to A0, the corresponding attack expression in AF∪ is exactly the same as
for A0 in isolation. Letting L0 = {x ·y : 〈x, y〉 ∈ A0}, the attack expression
17
for the finite subframework is aˆ0 = hd((Σ0 · I) ∩ L0).
As to the attack relationsA1, . . .An of the infinite subframeworksAF1, . . . AFn,
each relation Ai is described by an attack expression ai and we need to devise
a corresponding attack expression aˆi which preserves exactly the same attacks
between the arguments of AFi in the context of AF∪, i.e. for any set S ⊆ Σ∪
it must hold that aˆi(S) = aˆi(S ∩ Xi) = ai(S ∩ Xi). It can be seen that such
an expression aˆi can be obtained from ai by applying two simple replacement
operations concerning the basic elements σ and I (Rules 1 and 2 of Definition
13):
• each occurrence of σ (with σ an element of Σi) in ai is replaced by hd(σ ·
(I ∩Ki)) within aˆi, where Ki is the regular expression specifying Xi;
• each occurrence of I in ai is replaced by (I ∩Ki) within aˆi, where Ki is
as above.
It is immediate to see that if the attack expression ai consists exactly of I
or σ, the above replacements ensure that aˆi satisfies the desired property. By
inspection of the rules 3-5 of Definition 13 it is also easy to see that the desired
property is preserved in more articulated expressions, constructed by repeated
application of these rules starting from the basic elements, without requiring
any further modification.
17We remark that using Σ∪ instead of Σ0 would give the same result.
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Let us turn now to the specification of the additional finite attack relations
Ai,j (i 6= j) between subframeworks. First, observe that each Ai,j can be
specified directly as a regular language Li,j = {x · y : 〈x, y〉 ∈ Ai,j} and let
again Ki be the regular expression corresponding to Xi. Then, note that the
expression (Ki · I) ∩ Li,j is useful to select words in Li,j when appropriate and
that the quotient operator wrt Kj can then be applied to extract the subword
referring to the attacker. Finally, we have to ensure that the extracted subword
belongs to Ki which can be obtained by an intersection operation. In summary,
the attack expression specifying an attack relations Ai,j (i 6= j) is aˆi,j = (((Ki ·
I) ∩ Li,j)/Kj) ∩Ki.
Putting together the various subexpressions we have devised above, the com-
plete attack expression a∪ forAF∪ is given by a∪ =
⋃
i∈{0,...,n} aˆi∪
⋃
i,j∈{0,...,n},i6=j aˆi,j .
6. Computing with af Specifications
In this section we show18 that a number of problems that are well-known
to be efficiently, i.e. polynomial time, decidable in finite afs may be effectively
handled within the context of af specifications, i.e. there exist procedures which
are certain to produce the answer in a finite number of steps.
Theorem 3 provides the main result of this section.
Theorem 3. Let 〈M, a〉 be an afs, with induced argumentation framework
〈X ,A〉 and S ⊆ X . The following problems are decidable.
a. Deciding if the set S is conflict free
b. For x ∈ X , deciding if x ∈ F(S), i.e. whether x is acceptable to S
c. Deciding if S ∈ Eadm(〈X ,A〉), i.e. whether S is admissible
d. Deciding if S ∈ Estab(〈X ,A〉), i.e. whether S is a stable extension
e. Constructing a dfa accepting F(S) = X \ pi+a (X \ pi
+
a (S)), i.e. the set of
arguments acceptable to S.
f. Deciding if S ∈ Ecomp(〈X ,A〉), i.e. whether S is a complete extension
The algorithms described in the proof of Theorem 3 provide full solutions
to the decision problems listed above and are applicable irrespective of whether
〈M, a〉 gives rise to finitary frameworks or not. For the construction of the
grounded extension we obtain a result applicable to finitary argumentation
frameworks only. In fact, in [37] it is shown that, letting F1(S) = F(S), and
for i > 1 F i(S) = F(F i−1(S)), for a finitary argumentation framework the
grounded extension is given by
⋃
i≥1 F
i(∅).
Using this result we can in some cases obtain (a representation of) the
grounded extension through Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 effectively reproduces the sequence of iterations involving:
• identifying unattacked arguments in X (in l.2 and l.7), where we note that
Y0 computes F(∅), i.e. X \ pi+a (X ) since pi
+
a (∅) = ∅;
18The proofs relevant to this section are given in Appendix B.3.
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Algorithm 1 Computing Egr(〈X ,A〉) from (finitary) afs 〈M, a〉
1: X0 := L(M);
2: Y0 := X0 \ pi+a (X0);
3: G := Y0;
4: k := 0;
5: while Yk 6= ∅ do
6: Xk+1 := Xk \ (Yk ∪ pi+a (Yk));
7: Yk+1 := Xk+1 \ pi+a (Xk+1);
8: G := G ∪ Yk+1;
9: k := k + 1;
10: end while
11: report MG where L(MG) = G.
• adding these to the extension being accumulated (in l.3 and l.8);
• repeating this process on the af induced by the arguments remaining after
removing these and those they attack (in l.6).
The process terminates when the set of unattacked arguments is empty.
Let us exemplify the application of Algorithm 1 to AFR. Starting with the
set of unattacked arguments, we get Y0 = 000 · (000)∗ at l.2. Then, given that
pi+a (Y0) = 00·(000)
∗ in the first iteration of the while loop we get X1 = 0·(000)∗
at l.6 and, given that pi+a (X1) = 00 · (000)
∗, we get Y1 = X1 at l.7 and G =
(000 · (000)∗) ∪ (0 · (000)∗) then in the next iteration X2 = Y2 = ∅ and the
algorithm terminates.
Algorithm 1, however, does not guarantee termination, since it terminates
only in the cases where there is k such that Fk+1(∅) = Fk(∅). For instance in the
framework AFU of Example 3, in which for i ≥ 1, Fi = { 02k−1 : 1 ≤ k ≤ i},
no such k exists.
In such cases we can use properties of the operations involved in defining
attack expressions together with known identities for regular expressions to
derive the form taken by arguments in the grounded extension directly. In the
case of AFU we recall that,
X = { 0i : i ≥ 1}
a = tl(I)
pi−a (S) = tl(S)
pi+a (S) = 0 · S
For notational ease we write T for X \ T so that F0 = ∅, Fi = F(Fi−1) and
F(T ) = pi+a ( pi
+
a (T ) )
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For AFU we get
F1 = 0 · 0 · ∅
= 0 · X
= {0}
F2 = 0 · 0 · 0
= {0 · 0} ∪ {0 · 0 · 0 · 0 · 0k : k ≥ 0}
= {0, 0 · 0 · 0}
. . .
Fi+1 = 0 · {02k : 1 ≤ k ≤ i}
= 0 · {{02k−1 : 1 ≤ k ≤ i} ∪ {02i+1 · 0j : j ≥ 0}}
= {02k : 1 ≤ k ≤ i} ∪ {02i+2 · 0j : j ≥ 0}
= {02k−1 : 1 ≤ k ≤ i+ 1}
So that the least fixed-point is the infinite set {02i−1 : i ≥ 1}: note that, by
the analysis given, this is a fixed-point and it is straightforward to show that
no strict subset defines a fixed-point.
The analysis in the infinite case of those problems which are computationally
intractable within finite afs (cf. the summary presented in Fact 1) is left to
future work. As a first step in this direction, we can show that, restricting again
to finitary frameworks, limited decision procedures are possible for two of these
problems. Note that we currently have no result on whether these problems
are decidable: Theorem 4 ensures that, if this is not the case, they are at least
semi-decidable.
Theorem 4. Let 〈M, a〉 be an afs in which the induced argumentation frame-
work 〈X ,A〉 is finitary. The following problems are all semi-decidable.
a. Determining if Estab(〈X ,A〉) = ∅.
b. Given a finite R ⊂ X , determining if ∀ w ∈ R ¬caadm(〈X ,A〉, w).
We note that the restriction to finitary frameworks (and finite subsets of X
in the second part) is needed: without this the method used in proving Thm. 4
could not be applied.
To conclude this section, as some of the results we provided rely on the con-
dition that an af specification gives rise to a finitary argumentation framework,
one is interested in conditions ensuring that this holds. We provide an easy
sufficient condition to this purpose, namely the absence of the ∗ operator in
the attack expression, leaving further investigations on this specific question for
future work.
Proposition 9. Let 〈M, a〉 be an afs with induced argumentation framework
〈X ,→a〉. Let K = {K1Σ, K
2
Σ, . . . ,K
r
Σ} be the set of regular expressions used
in defining a, i.e. with operations b ·KΣ, KΣ · b, KΣ/b, b/KΣ and b∩KΣ. If no
K ∈ K uses the ∗ operator then 〈X ,→a〉 is finitary.
It is easy to see that the condition of Proposition 9 is not a necessary one.
Consider, for example a = hd(I · (σ1 + σ2)∗). This is finitary, however, fails to
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satisfy the conditions of Propn. 9. Less trivially, a = (σ1 · (σ1)∗) · I · (σ2 · (σ2)∗)
will be finitary when X ∩ {σ1 · (σ1)∗ · x · σ2 · (σ2)∗} is bounded for all x ∈ X .
7. af Specifications at Work
In this section we illustrate the suitability of our approach by showing how
it can be used to provide a formal representation of four examples which alto-
gether combine different features. Two of the examples (presented in sections
7.1 and 7.2) are abstract in nature (they have been previously introduced in
the literature mainly for the sake of theoretical analysis), while the examples
of sections 7.3 and 7.4 are inspired to realistic application domains (also taken
from the literature) and have been introduced in Section 2.2. The two ab-
stract examples of sections 7.1 and 7.2 concern infinite non-finitary afs, while
the “application-oriented” examples of sections 7.3 and 7.4 give rise to infinite
finitary afs.
Moreover, we remark that the examples of sections 7.2 and 7.4 are based
on a formalization in terms of a logic program featuring an infinite Herbrand
base. In fact, the formalization in argumentation terms of logic programs with
infinite Herbrand base is, at a general level, one of the “natural” applications
of the proposed framework, given that a direct correspondence between logic
programs with negation as failure and abstract argumentation frameworks has
been established in Dung’s paper itself.
We will present the abstract examples before, as they are more suitable to
illustrate in detail the technical use of the formalism as a specification tool in
articulated frameworks, and later the “application-oriented” examples, to give
an account of some potential practical uses of the formalism without cluttering
the description of the more realistic examples with too much technical details,
derivable by analogy from the first examples.
7.1. The af from Caminada and Verheij [30]
In [30] Caminada and Verheij describe a (non-finitary) af, 〈X ,A〉 (see Figure
3) with the property that 〈X ,A〉 has no semi-stable extension19, i.e. admissible
set S for which S ∪ S+ is maximal wrt ⊆. The construction uses arguments
X = { Ai : i ≥ 1 } ∪ { Bi : i ≥ 1 } ∪ { Ci : i ≥ 1 }
linked by the attack relation, A, containing
{ 〈Ai, Ai〉 : i ≥ 1 } ∪ { 〈Bj , Ai〉 : j ≥ i ≥ 1 } ∪
{ 〈Bi, Ci〉 : i ≥ 1 } ∪ { 〈Bj , Bi〉 : j > i ≥ 1 } ∪
{ 〈Ci, Bi〉 : i ≥ 1 }
19The existence of semi-stable extensions in finitary argumentation frameworks is analyzed
in [91].
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0 , A1 00 , B1 000 , C1
04 , A2 0
5 , B2 0
6 , C2
07 , A3 0
8 , B3 0
9 , C3
Figure 3: An infinite af with no semi-stable extensions.
One obvious choice to describe this scheme would be the set Σ = {A,B,C}
so that
X = {A} · {A}∗ ∪ {B} · {B}∗ ∪ {C} · {C}∗
It is not too hard to see, however, that it is impossible to describe the required
set of attacks via some a ∈ AE({A,B,C}): for example suppose S is an infinite
regular subset of {Ai : i ≥ 1}. Then
pi−a (S) = { B
j : j ≥ min{i : Ai ∈ S}} ∪ S
Now while this is a regular language for any fixed subset of {Ai : i ≥ 1} given
that it requires determining min{ i : Ai ∈ S} it is not possible to construct a
general expression allowing this minimum to be computed.
Nevertheless this scheme can be described within our formalism. Let Σ = {0}
and X = {0i : i ≥ 1} = {0} · {0}∗. We can partition X into three sets, LA,
LB and LC , as follows:
LA = {03i+1 : i ≥ 0} = {0} · {000}∗
LB = {03i+2 : i ≥ 0} = {00} · {000}∗
LC = {03i : i ≥ 1} = {000} · {000}∗
We can now identify the attack expression:
• each element of LA is attacked by itself, giving rise to the sub-expression
I ∩LA, and by all elements of LB with greater or equal index, giving rise
to the sub-expression (I ∩ LA) · 0 · (000)∗;
• each element of LB is attacked by the element of LC with the same index,
giving rise to the sub-expression (I ∩ LB) · 0, and by all elements of LB
with greater index, giving rise to the sub-expression (I∩LB)·(000)·(000)∗;
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• each element of LC is attacked by the element of LB with the same index,
giving rise to the sub-expression tl(I ∩ LC).
Summing up, we get
a = (I ∩ LA) ∪ (I ∩ LA) · 0 · (000)∗ ∪
(I ∩ LB) · (000) · (000)∗ ∪ (I ∩ LB) · 0 ∪
tl(I ∩ LC)
giving directly
pi−a (S) = S ∩ LA ∪ (S ∩ LA) · 0 · (000)
∗ ∪
(S ∩ LB) · (000) · (000)∗ ∪ (S ∩ LB) · 0 ∪
tl(S ∩ LC)
In order to compute pi+a (S), we need to take into account Fact 2. From 2.2 the
inverted mapping will be the union of the inverted sub-mappings corresponding
to the various sub-expressions of a.
• The first term: I∩LA, according to 2.7 with b = I, gives rise to I
+(S∩LA),
and thus, from 2.1, to S ∩ LA.
• As to the second term (I ∩ LA) · 0 · (000)∗, from 2.3 with b = (I ∩ LA)
we obtain b+(S/{0 · (000)∗}). In turn, to obtain b+, 2.7 applies, which
letting c = I yields c+(LA ∩ (S/{0 · (000)∗})), which applying 2.1 yields
LA ∩ (S/{0 · (000)∗}).
• Following the same steps, from (I ∩ LB) · (000) · (000)∗ we obtain LB ∩
(S/{000 · (000)∗}), and from (I ∩ LB) · 0 we derive LB ∩ (S/0).
• Finally from tl(I ∩LC), applying 2.9 with b = I ∩LC we obtain b
+(Σ ·S).
Applying then 2.7 with c = I we get c+(LC ∩ Σ · S), which applying 2.1
yields LC ∩ Σ · S.
Putting things together (according to Fact 2.2), we obtain
pi+a (S) = (S ∩ LA) ∪ (LA ∩ (S/{0 · (000)
∗})) ∪
(LB ∩ (S/{000 · (000)∗})) ∪ (LB ∩ (S/0)) ∪
(LC ∩ (Σ · S))
We can now exemplify the use of the computational procedures20 of Section
6 in this case. Let us start with the check of conflict-freeness, which for a set
S involves verifying whether pi−a (S) ∩ S = ∅. From the formulation of pi
+
a (S)
given above it is easily verifiable that:
• any set S such that S ∩ LA 6= ∅ is not conflict-free;
• any set S such that |S ∩ LB| ≥ 2 is not conflict-free;
20The reader is referred to the proof of Theorem 3 for the underlying details.
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• any set S ⊆ LC is conflict-free.
As to conflict-freeness, leaving apart the empty set, we have therefore to consider
only singletons of the form S = {00 · (000)i} with a fixed i ≥ 0, any set S ⊆ LC ,
and the union of any of the singletons {00 ·(000)i} with any subset of LC \{000 ·
(000)i}. For admissibility of a set S, one has to verify whether pi+a (S) ⊇ pi
−
a (S)
in addition to conflict-freeness. For the generic singleton S = {00 · (000)i},
we have pi+a (S) = {0 · (000)
j} ∪ {00 · (000)k} ∪ {000 · (000)i} for 0 ≤ j ≤ i
and 0 ≤ k < i, while pi−a (S) = {00 · (000)
i+1 · (000)∗} ∪ {000 · (000)i}. Since
{00 · (000)i+1 · (000)∗} ∩ pi+a (S) = ∅, it turns out that pi
+
a (S) + pi
−
a (S) hence no
S = {00 · (000)i} is admissible. Considering instead any set S ⊆ LC it can be
seen that pi+a (S) = LB∩(S/0) = tl(S∩LC) = pi
−
a (S). Hence any subset of LC is
admissible. Considering now the union S of a singleton {00·(000)i} and a subset
of LC , since pi
−
a ({00 · (000)
i}) ⊇ {00 · (000)i+1 · (000)∗} then {(000)i+2 · (000)∗}
must be contained in S. Taking now into account the facts above, it turns out
that S = {00 · (000)i, (000)i+2 · (000)∗} ∪ L′ for any L′ ⊆ {(000)j|1 ≤ j ≤ i}.
To determine whether an admissible set S ⊆ LC is a complete extension we
have to check whether S = F(S) = X \ pi+a (X \ pi
+
a (S)). Considering any such
S ⊆ LC , we have already seen that pi+a (S) = LB ∩ (S/0). Hence X \ pi
+
a (S) =
LA ∪ (LB \ (S/0)) ∪ LC . It follows that pi+a (X \ pi
+
a (S)) = LA ∪ LB ∪ (LC \ S),
and hence F(S) = X \ (LA ∪ LB ∪ (LC \ S)) = S. As to the sets of the form
S = {00 · (000)i, (000)i+2 · (000)∗} ∪ L′, it turns out (using the same reasoning
line) that F(S) = {00 · (000)i} ∪ (LC \ {000 · (000)
i}), which is also the unique
complete extension including {00 · (000)i}. Summing up, all (either finite or
infinite) subsets of LC plus the sets {00 · (000)i} ∪ (LC \ {000 · (000)i}) with
i ≥ 0 form the set of all the complete extensions of this framework.
7.2. Dung’s example
We will now consider the infinite argumentation framework introduced in
[37, p. 331, 352]. The framework is derived from the following logic program21
Q.
Q : r← not p (r1)
p← not q(x) (r2)
q(x)← even(x) (r3)
q(x)← not even(x) (r4)
even(s(x))← not even(x) (r5)
even(0)← (r6)
The rules for transforming a logic program into an AF are defined in [37, p.
343] as follows.
First of all, for a logic program P , GP denotes the set of all ground instances
of clauses in P . For each literal h, the complement of h is denoted by h∗. Let
K = {not b1, . . . , not bm} be a set of ground negative literals. A ground atom
21In the logic program Q, x is any natural number, s(x) denotes the successor of x and q(x)
can be regarded as any property of all natural numbers.
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k is said to be a defeasible consequence of P,K if there is a sequence of ground
atoms (e0, e1, . . . , en) with en = k such that for each ei, either ei ← ∈ GP or
ei is the head of a clause ei ← a1, . . . , at, not at+1, . . . , not at+r in GP such that
the positive literals a1, . . . , at belong to the preceding members in the sequence
and the negative literals not at+1, . . . , not at+3 belong to K. K is said to be a
support for k with respect to P .
A logic program P is transformed into an af AF (P ) = 〈XP ,AP 〉 as follows:
XP = {(K, k)|K is a support for k with respect to P}
∪{({not k}, not k)|k is a ground atom};
(K,h) attacks (K ′, h′) ⇔ h∗ ∈ K ′
Arguments of the form ({not k}, not k) capture the idea that k would be
concluded false if there is no acceptable argument supporting k. An argument a
attacks an argument b when the consequence of a contradicts one of the members
of the support of b.
The frameworkAF (Q) = 〈XQ,AQ〉, derived from the logic programQ, turns
out to be non finitary and is depicted in Figure 4. Note that to keep the notation
simple each predicate s(x¯) has been replaced by the result of the expression x¯+1.
A5 , ({}, even(0))
A , ({}, q(0))
A11 , ({¬even(0)}, even(1))
({¬even(n− 1)}, even(n))
A6 , ({¬even(0)},¬even(0))
A12 , ({¬even(1)},¬even(1))
({¬even(n)},¬even(n))
A4 , ({¬even(0)}, q(0))
A2 , ({¬q(0)},¬q(0))
A3 , ({¬q(0)}, p)
A7 , ({¬even(0)}, q(1))
A10 , ({¬even(1)}, q(1))
A8 , ({¬q(1)},¬q(1))
A9 , ({¬q(1)}, p)
B , ({¬p}, r) C , ({¬r},¬r)
D , ({¬p},¬p)
({¬even(n− 1)}, q(n))
({¬even(n)}, q(n))
({¬q(n)},¬q(n))
({¬q(n)}, p)
Figure 4: Graphical representation of AF (Q).
Let us examine the elements of XQ. First, there are arguments of the form
({not k}, not k) for each ground atom k, namely:
• two “single” arguments for the atoms p and r (at the right of the figure,
respectively in the lower and higher part)
• an infinite sequence of arguments for the atoms with form q(x¯), corre-
sponding to the fifth (from the left) “column” in Figure 4.
• an infinite sequence of arguments for the atoms with form even(x¯), corre-
sponding to the first (from the left) “column” in Figure 4
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Then, there are arguments of the form (K, k) derived by applying rules (r1)-
(r6), where K is a support for k. In particular we have:
• two arguments with empty support: from (r6) we get ({}, even(0)) (top
of the second “column”) and from (r6) and (r3) we get ({}, q(0)) (above
third “column” in Figure 4)
• a “single” argument ({not p}, r) from (r1) (at the right of the figure, in
the higher part)
• an infinite sequence of arguments of the form ({not q(x¯)}, p)|x¯ ≥ 0 from
(r2) (sixth “column”)
• an infinite sequence of arguments of the form ({not even(x¯)}, q(x¯))|x¯ ≥ 0
from (r4) (fourth “column”)
• an infinite sequence of arguments of the form ({not even(x¯)}, even(x¯ +
1))|x¯ ≥ 0 from (r5) (second “column”)
• an infinite sequence of arguments of the form ({not even(x¯)}, q(x¯+1))|x¯ ≥
0 from (r5) and (r3) (third “column”)
Turning to the attack relation AQ, we observe that:
• each argument in the second “column”, (with consequence even(x¯)) at-
tacks the corresponding arguments in the first, third and fourth “columns”
(having support not even(x¯))
• each argument in the second “column” also attacks its “successor” in the
column
• each argument in the third “column”, (with consequence q(x¯)) attacks the
corresponding arguments in the fifth and sixth “columns” (having support
not q(x¯))
• similarly, each argument in the fourth “column”, (with consequence q(x¯))
attacks the corresponding arguments in the fifth and sixth “columns” (hav-
ing support not q(x¯))
• each argument in the sixth “column” (with consequence p) attacks both
arguments ({not p}, not p) and ({not p}, r)
• argument ({not p}, r) attacks ({not r}, not r)
In order to provide an af specification for AF (Q) we need first a dfa rep-
resenting the infinite set of arguments XQ and then a proper attack expression
representing the relation AQ.
As to the dfa representation of XQ, it is handy to consider separately the
infinite sequences corresponding to the six “columns” in Figure 4 and the three
“single” arguments ({not p}, r), ({not r}, not r), and ({not p}, not p).
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As to the arguments included in the “columns”, we define a correspondence
with sequences of a unique symbol, namely A, by exploiting the “regular” struc-
ture of the sequences of arguments. In fact, let us associate the string A with
argument ({}, q(0)), AA with argument ({not q(0)}, not q(0)), AAA with ar-
gument ({not q(0)}, p), AAAA with argument ({not even(0)}, q(0)), A5 with
argument ({}, even(0)), and A6 with argument ({not even(0)}, not even(0)).
The association may then continue periodically over the “columns” by putting
A7 in correspondence with ({not even(0)}, q(1)), A8 with ({not q(1)}, not q(1))
and so on. More formally, we use the elements of A ·A∗ to represent arguments
as follows:
A , ({}, q(0))
∀x¯ ≥ 0, A2+6x¯ , ({not q(x¯)}, not q(x¯))
∀x¯ ≥ 0, A3+6x¯ , ({not q(x¯)}, p)
∀x¯ ≥ 0, A4+6x¯ , ({not even(x¯)}, q(x¯))
A5 , ({}, even(0))
∀x¯ ≥ 0, A6+6x¯ , ({not even(x¯)}, not even(x¯))
∀x¯ ≥ 0, A7+6x¯ , ({not even(x¯)}, q(x¯+ 1))
∀x¯ ≥ 0, A11+6x¯ , ({not even(x¯)}, even(x¯+ 1))
To simplify the subsequent description it is useful to denote as six distinct
(regular) languages the subsets of A∗ corresponding to the different sequences
of arguments in XQ:
L2 , {A2+6x¯|x¯ ≥ 0}
L3 , {A3+6x¯|x¯ ≥ 0}
L4 , {A4+6x¯|x¯ ≥ 0}
L6 , {A6+6x¯|x¯ ≥ 0}
L7 , {A7+6x¯|x¯ ≥ 0}
L11 , {A11+6x¯|x¯ ≥ 0}
To complete the representation of XQ, the remaining three “single” argu-
ments are assigned three distinct alphabet elements as follows:
• B , ({not p}, r)
• C , ({not r}, not r)
• D , ({not p}, not p)
In summary, the representation of the arguments in AF (Q) is based on the
set of symbols ΣQ = {A,B,C,D} and the encoding consists of a DFA MQ
accepting the language L(MQ) = {B,C,D} ∪ {A · A∗}. Clearly L(MQ) is a
regular language included in Σ∗Q \ {ε}.
The simple minimal DFA accepting L(MQ) is depicted in Figure 5.
We need now to identify a suitable attack expression aQ for AF (Q). To
this purpose let us first observe that, for a set of arguments S, the function
pi−
aQ
(S) must return as result a non-empty set if and only if S has a non empty
intersection with the set of arguments which receive an attack in AF (Q), namely
{B,C,D} ∪ L2 ∪ L3 ∪ L4 ∪ L6 ∪ L7 ∪ L11. As a consequence, the global attack
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DCA
A
B
q1
q0
q3
q2
q4
Figure 5: Graphical representation of the minimal DFA describing the argument encoding of
AF (Q).
expression may be built as the union of various sub-expressions, each associated
with a class of attacked arguments. Each sub-expression:
• has to select the range of sets for which a non-empty result is returned:
this can be achieved specifying the intersection between I and a given
sub-language of XQ corresponding to the class of attacked arguments;
• has to define a set of attackers through a proper symbol manipulation.
To exemplify, consider a sub-expression to specify the attackers of argument
B, namely {A3+6x¯|x¯ ≥ 0} (corresponding to {({not q(x¯)}, p)}, x¯ ≥ 0). This can
be obtained as tl(I ∩ B) · AAA · (A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
6
)∗ = tl(I ∩ B) · L3. In fact, I ∩ B
yields either {B} or the empty set. In the former case the tl operator yields ε
which, combined with L3, gives the desired result, while in the latter case the
combination produces the empty set. In a similar (and simpler) way, since C
is attacked only by B we obtain the subexpression tl(I ∩ C) · B, while D has
exactly the same attackers as B, yielding tl(I ∩D) · L3.
Consider now the specification of the attackers of the elements of sub-
languages of XQ. Starting from L2 we observe that each element A2+6x¯ (cor-
responding to ({not q(x¯)}, not q(x¯)), x¯ ≥ 0) has two attackers namely A2+6x¯−1
(corresponding to ({}, q(0)) for x¯ = 0 and to ({not even(x¯−1)}, q(x¯)) for x¯ > 0)
and A2+6x¯+2 (corresponding to ({not even(x¯)}, q(x¯)), x¯ ≥ 0). The elements of
the first family of attackers can be obtained by applying the tl operator to L2,
those of the second family of attackers by concatenating A · A to L2. This
reasoning gives rise to the sub-expressions tl(I ∩ L2) and (I ∩ L2) ·A · A.
Similarly, each element of L3 A
3+6x¯ (corresponding to ({not q(x¯)}, p), x¯ ≥ 0)
has two attackers namely A3+6x¯+1 (corresponding to ({not even(x¯)}, q(x¯)), x¯ ≥
0) and A3+6x¯−2 (corresponding to ({}, q(0)) for x¯ = 0 and to ({not even(x¯ −
1)}, q(x¯)) for x¯ ≥ 1). This reasoning gives rise to the sub-expressions22 (I∩L3)·A
and tl2(I ∩ L3).
22In the following, in order to simplify notation, we denote as tln(w) the nth application of
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As to L4, each elementA
4+6x¯ (corresponding to ({not even(x¯)}, q(x¯)), x¯ ≥ 0)
has one attacker A4+6x¯+1 (corresponding to ({}, even(0)) for x¯ = 0 and to
({not even(x¯ − 1)}, even(x¯)), x¯ ≥ 1). This gives rise to the sub-expression
(I ∩ L4) ·A.
Turning to L6, each element A
6+6x¯ (corresponding to ({not even(x¯)}, not even(x¯)),
x¯ ≥ 0) has one attacker A6+6x¯−1 (corresponding to ({}, even(0)) for x¯ = 0 and
to ({not even(x¯ − 1)}, even(x¯)), x¯ ≥ 1). This gives rise to the sub-expression
tl(I ∩ L6).
In L7, each element A
7+6x¯ (corresponding to ({not even(x¯)}, q(x¯+1)), x¯ ≥ 0)
has one attacker A7+6x¯−2 (corresponding to ({}, even(0)) for x¯ = 0 and to
({not even(x¯ − 1)}, even(x¯)), x¯ ≥ 1). This gives rise to the sub-expression
tl2(I ∩ L7).
Finally, each element of L11 A
11+6x¯,(corresponding to ({not even(x¯)}, even(x¯+
1)), x¯ ≥ 0) has one attacker A11+6x¯−6 (corresponding to ({}, even(0)) for x¯ = 0
and to ({not even(x¯−1)}, even(x¯)), x¯ ≥ 1). This gives rise to the sub-expression
tl6(I ∩ L11).
In summary, we obtain the following attack expression:
aQ , tl(I ∩B) · L3 ∪
tl(I ∩ C) · B ∪
tl(I ∩D) · L3 ∪
tl(I ∩ L2) ∪
(I ∩ L2) · A ·A ∪
tl2(I ∩ L3) ∪
(I ∩ L3) · A ∪
(I ∩ L4) · A ∪
tl(I ∩ L6) ∪
tl2(I ∩ L7) ∪
tl6(I ∩ L11)
The relevant mapping aQ : 2Σ
∗
Q → 2Σ
∗
Q follows directly:
aQ(S) = tl(S ∩B) · L3 ∪
tl(S ∩ C) ·B ∪
tl(S ∩D) · L3 ∪
tl(S ∩ L2) ∪
(S ∩ L2) ·A · A ∪
tl2(S ∩ L3) ∪
tl(·) to the word w, namely tl(tl(. . . (tl(w)))).
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(S ∩ L3) ·A ∪
(S ∩ L4) ·A ∪
tl(S ∩ L6) ∪
tl2(S ∩ L7) ∪
tl6(S ∩ L11)
We can now apply Fact 2 to obtain the inverted mapping aQ
+
. First, we
observe that on the basis of 2.2 the inverted mapping will be the union of the
inverted sub-mappings corresponding to the various sub-expressions of aQ.
Consider first, for the sake of illustration, the sub-expression tl(I ∩ B) · L3,
which has the form b ·KΣ with b = tl(I ∩ B) and KΣ = L3. Accordingly, Fact
2.3 applies, yielding b+(S/L3). In turn, to obtain b
+, Fact 2.9 applies which,
letting c = I ∩ B, gives c+(ΣQ · (S/L3)). Applying Fact 2.7 (and the base case
for I) to c we obtain B ∩ (ΣQ · (S/L3)).
The sub-expressions tl(I ∩ C) · B and tl(I ∩D) · L3 are analogous, yielding
C ∩ (ΣQ · (S/B)) and D ∩ (ΣQ · (S/L3)).
From the sub-expression tl(I ∩ L2) orderly applying Fact 2.9 and 2.7 we
obtain L2 ∩ (ΣQ · S), while from (I ∩ L2) · A · A applying 2.3 and 2.7 we have
L2 ∩ (S/(A ·A)).
For the sub-expression tl2(I ∩L3) we apply 2.9 twice and 2.7, yielding L3 ∩
(ΣQ · ΣQ · S).
The treatment of each of the remaining sub-expressions is similar to one of
the previous cases, yielding the following result.
aQ
+
(S) = B ∩ (ΣQ · (S/L3)) ∪
C ∩ (ΣQ · (S/B)) ∪
D ∩ (ΣQ · (S/L3)) ∪
L2 ∩ (ΣQ · S) ∪
L2 ∩ (S/(A · A)) ∪
L3 ∩ (ΣQ · ΣQ · S) ∪
L3 ∩ (S/A) ∪
L4 ∩ (S/A) ∪
L6 ∩ (ΣQ · S) ∪
L7 ∩ (ΣQ · ΣQ · S) ∪
L11 ∩ (ΣQ · ΣQ · ΣQ · ΣQ · ΣQ · ΣQ · S)
It can be easily observed that both aQ and aQ
+
can not produce results
outside XQ hence, for any S ⊆ XQ, pi
−
aQ
(S) = aQ(S)∩XQ = aQ(S) and pi
+
aQ
(S) =
aQ
+
(S) ∩ XQ = aQ
+
(S).
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We can now exemplify the analysis of semantics properties in AF (Q).
Letting S = {B} ∪ {D} ∪ {A1+12x¯|x¯ ≥ 0} ∪ {A5+12x¯|x¯ ≥ 0} ∪ {A10+12x¯|x¯ ≥
0}∪{A12+12x¯|x¯ ≥ 0} consider the problem of checking whether S is conflict-free
(the structure of the infinite set S is evidenced in Figure 6).
A5 , ({}, even(0))
A , ({}, q(0))
A11 , ({¬even(0)}, even(1))
({¬even(n− 1)}, even(n))
A6 , ({¬even(0)},¬even(0))
A12 , ({¬even(1)},¬even(1))
({¬even(n)},¬even(n))
A4 , ({¬even(0)}, q(0))
A2 , ({¬q(0)},¬q(0))
A3 , ({¬q(0)}, p)
A7 , ({¬even(0)}, q(1))
A10 , ({¬even(1)}, q(1))
A8 , ({¬q(1)},¬q(1))
A9 , ({¬q(1)}, p)
B , ({¬p}, r) C , ({¬r},¬r)
D , ({¬p},¬p)
({¬even(n− 1)}, q(n))
({¬even(n)}, q(n))
({¬q(n)},¬q(n))
({¬q(n)}, p)
Figure 6: AF (Q) with an infinite subset evidenced.
We have to prove that pi−
aQ
(S) ∩ S = ∅.
We can now apply aQ to the subsets forming the definition of S. Noting in
particular that
• {A1+12x¯|x¯ ≥ 0} intersects L7 “starting” from A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
13
• {A5+12x¯|x¯ ≥ 0} intersects L11 “starting” from A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
17
• {A10+12x¯|x¯ ≥ 0} intersects L4 “starting” from A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
10
• {A12+12x¯|x¯ ≥ 0} intersects L6 “starting” from A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
we obtain:
pi−
aQ
(S) = L3 ∪ L3 ∪
tl2(A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
13
·(A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗) ∪
tl6(A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
17
·(A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗) ∪
(A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
10
·(A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗) · A ∪
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tl(A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
·(A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗).
Noting that the last four elements of the above expression coincide, we have
pi−
aQ
(S) = L3 ∪ A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
11
·(A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗. As to conflict-freeness, it is easily seen
that pi−
aQ
(S) ∩ S = ∅.
Let us now turn to the problem of acceptability checking, by verifying
whether the argument B is acceptable wrt S, i.e. B ∈ FQ(S). This requires to
check whether pi−
aQ
({B}) \ pi+
aQ
(S) = ∅ (see the proof of part b of Theorem 3).
To identify pi+
aQ
(S) we can apply aQ
+
to the subsets evidenced in the above
definition of S. In particular:
• the second item in the definition of aQ
+
is effective (i.e. gives a non-empty
result) on {B} yielding {C}
• no item is effective on {D}
• the fourth and sixth items are effective on {A1+12x¯|x¯ ≥ 0} yielding A ·A ·
(A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ and A · A · A · (A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗
• the eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh items are effective on {A5+12x¯|x¯ ≥
0} yieldingA · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
4
·(A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗, A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
6
·(A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗, A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
7
·(A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗,
A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
11
·(A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗
• the fifth and seventh items are effective on {A10+12x¯|x¯ ≥ 0} yielding
A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
8
·(A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ and A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
9
·(A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗
• no item is effective on {A12+12x¯|x¯ ≥ 0}
Summing up,
pi+
aQ
(S) = {C} ∪
A · A · (A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪
A · A · A · (A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪
A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
4
·(A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪
A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
6
·(A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪
A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
7
·(A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪
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A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
11
·(A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪
A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
8
·(A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪
A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
9
·(A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗.
Since pi−
aQ
({B}) = L3 while from the expression derived above we note that
A · A · A · (A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪ A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
9
·(A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ = L3 ⊂ pi
+
aQ
(S), it follows that
B ∈ FQ(S).
Let us now check whether S is admissible. We have already proved that S
is conflict free, therefore, from part (c) of Theorem 3, we have to check whether
pi−
aQ
(S) \ pi+
aQ
(S) = ∅.
Recalling
pi−
aQ
(S) = L3 ∪ A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
11
·(A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗
it is easily seen that pi−
aQ
(S) \ pi+
aQ
(S) = ∅.
We can also check whether S is a stable extension. Since S is conflict free,
we just need to confirm that S ∪ pi+a (S) = X :
S ∪ pi+
aQ
(S) = B ∪ D ∪ A · (A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪
A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
5
·(A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪ A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
10
·(A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪
A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
·(A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪
{C} ∪A · A · (A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪ A · A · A · (A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪
A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
4
·(A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪ A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
6
·(A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪
A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
7
·(A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪
A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
8
·(A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪ A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
9
·(A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪
A · . . . · A︸ ︷︷ ︸
11
·(A · . . . ·A︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
)∗ ∪
= A ·A∗ ∪ B ∪ C ∪ D
= XQ
Then S is a stable extension of AF (Q). From this fact it follows that S is also
a complete extension of AF (Q), hence FQ(S) = S. This could be independently
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verified, according to part (f) of Theorem 3, computing FQ(S) = XQ \ pi
+
aQ
( XQ\
pi+
aQ
(S) ). As we already know, XQ\pi
+
aQ
(S) = S, hence FQ(S) = XQ \ pi
+
aQ
(S) =
S.
It can also be observed that AF (Q) is well-founded (Definition 29 of [37])
namely there is no infinite sequence of arguments X0, X1, . . . , Xn, . . . such that
Xi+1 attacks Xi. Note in particular that letting X0 any argument in L11, i.e.
X0 = A
11+6x¯ for some x¯ ≥ 0, there is only a finite sequenceX0, . . . , Xx¯+1 satisfy-
ing the condition of Definition 29 in [37], with X1 = A
11+6(x¯−1), . . . , Xx¯+1 = A
5.
Note also that the framework would not be well-founded with a “reverse” at-
tack relation, namely if we had (A11+6(x¯+1), A11+6(x¯)) ∈ AQ instead of having
(A11+6(x¯−1), A11+6(x¯)) ∈ AQ.
Since AF (Q) is well-founded, by Theorem 30 of [37] it has exactly one com-
plete extension which is grounded, preferred and stable, namely the set S iden-
tified above. It is described by the regular language LEQgr accepted by the DFA
depicted in Figure 7.
D
A
A
C
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
B
A
q1
q0
q3
q2
q5
q4
q7
q6
q9
q8
q14
q15
q11
q10
q13
q12
Figure 7: A DFA accepting the regular language representing the unique complete, grounded,
preferred, and stable extension of AF (Q).
7.3. An example in multi-agent negotiation (from Sec. 2.2.1)
Referring to the description of the example given in Section 2.2.1, the global
argumentation framework AFneg arising from the non-terminating message ex-
changes among the three agents is depicted in Figure 8.
Upon detection of a long sequence of withdrawals and reiterations of the same
offers (and assuming that the agents programmatically repeat their behavior),
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O1
O2 O3
W1
W2 W3
O4
O5 O6
W4
W5 W6
Figure 8: Graphical representation of AFneg .
the market authority can identify23 the relevant AF specification, which can be
given as follows.
Let Σ = {0} and X = {0i : i ≥ 1} = {0} · {0}∗. We can partition X into
six sets LA, LB, LC , LD, LE , and LF (corresponding respectively to the six se-
quences {O1, O4, . . .}, {O2, O5, . . .}, {O3, O6, . . .}, {W1,W4, . . .}, {W2,W5, . . .},
{W3,W6, . . .}) as follows:
LA = {06i+1 : i ≥ 0} = {0} · {000000}∗
LB = {06i+2 : i ≥ 0} = {00} · {000000}∗
LC = {06i+3 : i ≥ 0} = {000} · {000000}∗
LD = {06i+4 : i ≥ 0} = {0000} · {000000}∗
LE = {0
6i+5 : i ≥ 0} = {00000} · {000000}∗
LF = {06i : i ≥ 1} = {000000} · {000000}∗
The attack expression can then be formulated as follows:
a = (I · 000) ∪ (I ∩ LA) · 0 ∪ (I ∩ LA) · (00) ∪ (I ∩ LB) · 0 ∪ tl((I ∩ LB)) ∪
tl(I ∩ LC) ∪ tl(tl(I ∩ LC)).
The market authority can then stop the activities of the agents and check
whether some combination of offers and withdrawals can be regarded as a fea-
sible solution (the market authority is interested in favouring the execution of
as many exchanges as possible). Using the algorithms presented in Section 6, it
can be checked that:
• all three sets representing the reiteration of a specific offer, namely LA, LB,
and LC corresponding respectively to {O1, O4, O7, . . .}, {O2, O5, O8, . . .},
23The problem of identifying an AF specification from a regular sequence of observations has
direct connections with the the widely studied (and partially overlapping) fields of automata
identification and grammatical inference [34]. Defining algorithms for the identification of
AF specification is an interesting issue for future work, that we are confident can be faced
resorting to techniques borrowed from the above mentioned areas.
51
and {O3, O6, O9, . . .}, are admissible
• none of the possible pairwise unions of the three sets above is admissible
• each set consisting of the reiteration of an offer and of the withdrawals
of the two other offers (i.e. each of the following sets LA ∪ LE ∪ LF ;
LB ∪ LD ∪ LF ; LC ∪ LD ∪ LE ;) is stable.
On the basis of these evaluations, it emerges that exactly one of the three
exchanges can be executed, with the choice left to the authority itself.
Consider now a similar situation with four agents involved in the loop, with
the initial situation as described in Table 3.
Agent ID Owns Knows Preference rank
A1 Rd A2 owns Rc Ra > Rb > Rc > Rd
A2 Rc A3 owns Rb Rd > Ra > Rb > Rc
A3 Rb A4 owns Ra Rc > Rd > Ra > Rb
A4 Ra A1 owns Rd Rb > Rc > Rd > Ra
Table 3: Initial state of the negotiation example with 4 agents
In this case in the first round we have four offers, namely:
• O1 = Off(t0, (A1, A2, Exch(Rd, Rc)))
• O2 = Off(t0, (A2, A3, Exch(Rc, Rb)))
• O3 = Off(t0, (A3, A4, Exch(Rb, Ra)))
• O4 = Off(t0, (A4, A1, Exch(Ra, Rd)))
As in the case above we have consequently four withdrawals, four offers in turn
and so on (see the framework AFneg4 in Figure 9).
Skipping technical details, it turns out that:
• all three sets representing the reiteration of a specific offer, namelyO1, O5, O9, . . .,
O2, O6, O10, . . ., O3, O7, O11, . . ., and O4, O8, O12, . . ., are admissible;
• two of the pairwise unions of these sets are admissible namelyO1, O3, O5, . . .,
and O2, O4, O6, . . .;
• each set consisting of one of the above mentioned pairwise unions and of
the withdrawals of the two other offers is stable.
On the basis of these evaluations, it emerges that two exchanges can be
executed, with the choice left again to the authority.
In general, using the evaluation of an infinite framework, the authority can
go beyond detecting and stopping non terminating situations in this kind of
multi-agent dialogues: the added-value consists in identifying which exchanges
are anyway feasible in such situations.
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O1 O2
O3O4
W1 W4 W3 W2
O5 O6
O7O8
W5 W8 W7 W6
Figure 9: Graphical representation of AFneg4.
7.4. An example in ambient intelligence (from Sec. 2.2.2)
Referring to the description of the example given in Section 2.2.2 and omit-
ting the burden of some uninteresting details (in particular all arguments cor-
responding to default assumptions which are contradicted by facts), the argu-
mentation framework corresponding to the interactions among the components
of the ambient intelligence system consists of:
• a finite part corresponding to basic facts which are not time-dependent,
namely F1 = person(Brian), F2 = room(office), F3 = phone(Brianphone),
F4 = owner(Brianphone,Brian) and are not involved in attack relations;
• an infinite part consisting of the regular iteration of a section correspond-
ing to even time instants and a section corresponding to odd time in-
stants24.
The following arguments and attacks are common to all sections indepen-
dently of oddness or evenness of the time instant i:
• two facts corresponding to device readings: NVR(i) = ¬videorecogn(Brian, office, i),
PI(i) = phonein(Brianphone, office, i);
• an argument PL(i) with conclusion phlocated(Brianphone, i) derived from
fact phonein(Brianphone, office, i) using (r8);
• an argument V V (i) with conclusion videovalid(office, i) derived using (r9)
on the basis of the default assumption not dark(office, i);
24A similar but more articulated structure would arise in case the different sensors produce
data with different periods.
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• an argument IN(i) with conclusion in(Brian, office, i) derived using (r1)
on the basis of the default assumption not videovalid(office, i);
• an argument NIN(i) with conclusion ¬in(Brian, office, i) derived using
(r3) on the basis of the fact ¬videorecogn(Brian, office, i) and of the pre-
viously derived conclusion videovalid(office, i);
The following arguments are included only in sections corresponding to an
even time instant j:
• the fact D(j) corresponding to the device reading dark(office, j);
• an argument LO(j) with conclusion lighton(office, j + 1) derived using
(r6).
The following arguments are included only in sections corresponding to an
odd time instant k:
• the fact ND(k) corresponding to the device reading: ¬dark(office, k);
• an argument NLO(k) with conclusion ¬lighton(office, k+1) derived using
(r7).
As to attacks:
• each argument with conclusion videovalid(office, i) attacks the argument
with conclusion in(Brian, office, i);
• arguments with conclusion in(Brian, office, i) and ¬in(Brian, office, i) mu-
tually attack each other;
• each fact dark(office, i) attacks the arguments with conclusions videovalid(office, i)
and ¬in(Brian, office, i).
The corresponding argumentation frameworkAFamb is depicted in Figure 10.
The relevant AF specification can be given as follows. Let Σ = {F1, F2, F3, F4, 0}
and X = {F1, F2, F3, F4} ∪ {0i : i ≥ 1}. We can partition X \ {F1, F2, F3, F4}
into 10 sets LA, LB, LC , LD, LE , LF , LG, LH , LI , LJ ,(corresponding respec-
tively to the 10 sequences NVR(i), PI(i), PL(i), VV(i), IN(i), NIN(i), D(2i),
LO(2i), ND(2i+1), NLO(2i+1), with i ≥ 0:
LA = {08i+1 : i ≥ 0}
LB = {08i+2 : i ≥ 0}
LC = {08i+3 : i ≥ 0}
LD = {08i+4 : i ≥ 0}
LE = {08i+5 : i ≥ 0}
LF = {08i+6 : i ≥ 0}
LG = {016i+7 : i ≥ 0}
LH = {0
16i+8 : i ≥ 0}
LI = {016i+15 : i ≥ 0}
LJ = {016i+16 : i ≥ 0}
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F1 F2 F3 F4
NVR(0) PI(0) PL(0)
D(0) VV(0) IN(0)
NIN(0)LO(0)
ND(1) VV(1) IN(1)
NIN(1)NLO(1)
NVR(1) PI(1) PL(1)
Figure 10: Graphical representation of AFamb.
The attack expression can then be formulated as follows:
a = tl(I ∩LE)∪ (((I ∩LF ) · 0)∩LG)∪ (((I ∩LD) · 000)∩LG))∪ ((I ∩LE) ·
0) ∪ (tl(I ∩ LF )).
We observe that the attack expression satisfies the hypothesis of Proposition
9 hence it can be determined that the argumentation framework is finitary. Algo-
rithm 1 can then be applied and it can be verified that it terminates determining
the grounded extensionG = {F1, F2, F3, F4}∪LA∪LB∪LC∪(LD∩{016i+12 : i ≥
0})∪ (LE ∩ {016i+5 : i ≥ 0})∪ (LF ∩ {016i+14 : i ≥ 0})∪LG ∪LH ∪LI ∪LJ .
Using the method included in the proof of Theorem 3 it can also be verified that
G is stable, which implies that G is also the unique preferred extension.
From the argumentation perspective the situation is not pahological per se
and in fact this oscillating behavior is the desired one in case a person contin-
uously enters and exits a room. Computing a compact representation of the
grounded extension is however useful since it can be passed to a higher-level
reasoning module which may detect the anomaly that the conclusions entailed
by the system involve a person entering and exiting the same room let say every
5 seconds (or less). It can also be observed that, in this case, the produced
sequence of arguments is not actually infinite since the oscillating behavior will
stop with the sunrise the morning after (or the semester after if we are in a
polar winter). However, we are interested in analyzing (and stopping) such a
very long sequence of arguments produced with a regular pattern well before it
reaches its “natural” termination. To this purpose it can be definitely more ad-
vantageous to treat it as an infinite sequence with compact representation rather
than dealing explicitly with a finite sequence of thousands (if not millions) of
“machine-produced-always-the-same” arguments.
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8. Related Work
Treatments of infinite afs have, as already outlined, been largely limited to
specific instances exemplifying particular properties, e.g. that infinitary frame-
works may occur naturally, as in the main example from [37] presented in the
previous section, or the issue of existence of semi-stable extensions [30, 91]. Be-
yond such examples the principal results have not advanced noticeably since the
general properties proven in [37] were established. In particular, the question
of computational issues in infinite afs has not been considered.
At heart (interpretative matters aside) Dung’s afmodel is graph-theoretic (a
property exploited in much extant work on algorithmic and complexity treat-
ments of afs). The computational theory of infinite directed graphs has, in
contrast, long been recognised as a core area of graph theory, arguably dating
back to the beginning of the 20th century in the work of Thue [86]. Indeed, as
observed by Morvan [66]: “When dealing with computers, infinite graphs are
natural objects”.
The idea of viewing vertex sets as a formal language with an edge relationship
determined by operations on words representing vertices dates back at least as
far as Muller and Schupp [67] and much of the focus of such computational
treatments from a graph-theoretic perspective has tended to concentrate on,
what may loosely be termed, “specification processes” for generating families
of infinite graphs and model-theoretic treatments of logics defined via these
processes. Thus, Courcelle [33] addresses properties expressible in monadic
second-order logic with respect to bounded-width infinite graphs; Blumensath
and Gra¨del [19] consider model-theoretic issues for properties expressible in first-
order logic augmented with a quantifier, ∃ω, expressing the existence of infinitely
many objects within its scope. The “reachability problem” (given u and v is
there a directed path of edges from u to v) of importance in analyses of program
behaviour, has been widely studied, e.g in Thomas [85] and Colcombet [31].
In these treatments, as well as in our own approach, the central concern
is that of “finite presentations of infinite objects” and so, unsurprisingly, the
mechanisms adopted exhibit some structural similarities, e.g. in the use of
automata-theoretic models. Overall, however, the issues of interest differ: in
particular, aside from specialised studies such as that of Bean [13] regarding
colourings of infinite graphs, properties impinging directly on graph-theoretic
views of extension-based semantics have not explicitly been dealt with.
Turning to another field related to argumentation, infinite structures have
also received a significant deal of attention in the field of logic programming
where admitting function symbols and recursion in the language gives rise to
possibly infinite domains. Hence, a significant gain in expressiveness has to be
traded off with the possibility of actual implementation in practical solvers. Fo-
cusing on the family of ASP (Answer Set Programming) solvers, Bonatti [21, 22]
investigated the class of finitary logic programs which admit unbounded (pos-
sibly infinite) domains and cyclic definitions while ensuring that inference is
r.e.-complete. Finitary logic programs are therefore amenable to implementa-
tion within existing ASP solvers with suitable extensions. A larger class of logic
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programs with functions called finitely grounded is shown to preserve most of
the good properties of finitary programs in [12]. Unfortunately the class of fini-
tary logic programs is undecidable: several subsequent works have then been
devoted to investigate other classes of logic programs allowing functions, trading
off expressiveness and tractability in various ways. In [82, 48] a decidable class
of disjunctive logic programs with function symbols under stable model seman-
tics, called FDNC, is introduced and a method is provided to finitely represent
all the (possibly infinite) stable models of a given FDNC program. In [26, 28]
the semi-decidable class of finitely ground programs is considered, along with
its decidable subclass of finite domain programs, while another decidable sub-
class, called argument restricted, has been analyzed in [60]. Further, a decidable
subclass of finitary programs, called FP2, has been recently presented in [11].
On the implementation side, the DLV solver [59] has been extended to encom-
pass the treatment of finitely ground and finite domain programs resulting in a
publicly available system called DLV-complex [27].
The above studies witness a large interest in reasoning with infinite domains
in answer set programming, with a range of motivations including the explicit
treatment of recursive data structures like lists and trees, the encoding of prob-
lems not admitting a priori bounds on the solution size (e.g. planning or reason-
ing about actions), and the consideration of potentially infinite processes in time
(a biology-inspired example is provided in [48]). While many of the above needs
are common to argumentation theory (and more generally to any approach to
defeasible reasoning, as remarked in Section 2) it has to be acknowledged that
the significant advancements both on the theoretical and on the application side
surveyed above have no counterpart (yet) in the argumentation field, so that
the useful connections and interplay between the two fields have definitely to be
regarded as a future research subject. As far as the present work is concerned,
it can be remarked in particular that the investigations surveyed above lie at
the level of the representation language, which is abstracted away in Dung’s
framework, hence our work concerns a different, and not directly comparable,
abstraction level. Moreover the above works are based on the stable model se-
mantics adopted in the context of ASP solvers, while the approach proposed
in this paper is not committed to a specific semantics choice and hence is ap-
plicable beyond the limits of the stable semantics, which, as well-known, does
not always guarantees the existence of extensions (the existence of models in
the logic programming context) and does not feature, in general, some desirable
properties like directionality or relevance (see [8] for a discussion).
9. Further Work and Conclusions
Our main aim in this paper has been to present a formal approach to describe
both finite and infinite af structures, the argument set being the set of words
within some regular language, X ⊆ Σ∗, and the attack relation, A over X × X
being given through a sentence, a ∈ AE(Σ) constructed by a limited set of
operations so that for S ⊆ X , a(S) satisfies additivity (hence also monotonicity)
and preserves regularity. We provided some illustrations of the flexibility of our
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approach using examples from [37, 30]. More generally, the approach has been
shown to be able to capture standard finite afs and arbitrary finite combinations
of finite and infinite afs, which can reasonably be regarded as covering most (if
not all) situations of practical interest.
A related research line we are developing in parallel concerns the use of this
kind of techniques to represent infinite structures in extended versions of Dung’s
framework, some initial results concerning the afra formalism (Argumentation
Framework with Recursive Attacks) having been recently obtained [4].
We have concentrated on the expressive potential of afs, indicating that,
in contrast to “naive” encodings, processes which can be dealt with efficiently
in the finite setting – deciding conflict-freeness, admissibility, acceptability, ver-
ifying whether a set is a stable or complete extension as well as construction
problems such as computing the characteristic function – all admit effective
decision methods and algorithms for building automata accepting the corre-
sponding sets, even when the instances being checked or the results reported
are themselves infinite subsets of X . For the case of two problems, – existence of
stable extensions and determining credulous acceptance wrt preferred semantics
– unlikely to be efficiently decidable in the finite context we have shown that
within afs these are (at worst) semi-decidable.
We conclude by reviewing some topics meriting further development, a num-
ber of which are the subject of current work. One such immediate area of interest
concerns the efficiency with which particular procedures can be implemented
(as opposed to the issue of effectiveness). While some preliminary study of such
questions is underway we have chosen, partly for reasons of space, not to de-
velop this aspect in detail within the current paper. We note that such questions
concern two elements: the size (i.e. number of states) of automata achieving
particular tasks, and the computational complexity of the problems themselves.
The former, referred to as state complexity in the associated literature has been
widely studied25 so that tight bounds on state complexity delineating the num-
ber of states necessary and sufficient for an automaton accepting RθS or θ(R),
in terms of the state complexity of the languages R and S have been obtained
for each of the principal operations θ with each of the finite automaton forms
discussed. It is, clearly, the case that the extent to which, say, pi−a (S), may be
recognised by a “small” automaton will depend significantly not only on the
state complexity of S itself, but also on the exact specification of a ∈ AE(Σ).
As such it would seem unlikely that a completely general treatment of state
complexity for AE(Σ) (even if such is possible) will yield results of much inter-
est since this generality is likely to overestimate state complexity for those cases
that might arise in practice. A rather more promising approach is to consider
sub-classes of AE(Σ) obtained by constraining the operational structures, e.g.
given some finite “base language”, B ⊆ Σ∗ consider attack structures, a satis-
fying “v →a w only if v ∈ B or r(|v|, |w|)” (so that r(...) is determined through
some aspect of the lengths of v and w). In fact preliminary results of the authors,
25Important contributions may be found in [65, 18, 58, 71, 92].
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with B ⊆ Σ2 and the constraint “v →a w iff (v ∈ B and tl(B) = hd(w)) or
(v ∈ Σ·w)” indicate, using a careful treatment of the dfa form accepting X that
all of the cases shown to be effectively computable in Thm. 3 may be efficiently
implemented (in terms of state complexity and polynomial run-time).26
A further topic of some interest concerns the use of our approach in finite
frameworks. Although it is, of course, unnecessary to resort to afs schema to
describe finite 〈X ,A〉 there are, however, cases where it may be advantageous to
do so. For example, suppose |X | = 2m for some m ∈ N, then using Σ = {0, 1}
the set X can be viewed as {0, 1}m a language that is accepted by a dfa with
exactly m+1 states. Thus, for suitable A ⊆ X ×X the af, 〈X ,A〉 rather than
requiring a description whose size is O(2m) + |A| could be presented by one
whose size is O(mk) for some k ∈ N. In cases where such compaction can be
achieved, an important issue is the resulting cost of implementing standard deci-
sion procedures: an obvious concern is that, for this particular finite case, some
subsets of {0, 1}m will require automata whose state complexity is 2O(m). It is,
however, unclear whether this behaviour would be the only potential drawback,
e.g. what can be said regarding the complexity of caadm (for single, rather than
sets of arguments) in such settings?
As a final collection of problems we note that several issues remain open
concerning effective decision processes for extension-based semantics in afs. In
particular, although we have shown questions such as Estab = ∅ to be semi-
decidable (in finitary afs), the status of its converse is open, i.e. is it the case
that Estab 6= ∅ is semi-decidable? A positive answer would, of course, lead to an
effective procedure for existstab, while a negative answer motivates the question
of identifying decidable fragments of AE(Σ).
On a different side, it has to be acknowledged that afs is not an immediately
usable formal tool and that the specification of each example has been crafted
individually. In perspective, afs can be regarded as a “low level” language
which can represent the basis for the definition of higher level constructs for
the description of infinite afs, accompanied by suitable methodologies for their
application. In fact, some recurrent structural and representation patterns can
be identified in the examples considered in the paper and procedures to derive
afs from logic programs could be considered, but a full investigation of these
issues is left for future work.
In conclusion we emphasise once more that the development put forward
in this paper, while establishing many cases where an effective treatment of
infinite argumentation forms is realistic, provides a starting point for a wider
investigation of this matter.
26We remark that the afra structures described in [4] are a special case of this restriction:
illustrative efficient automata constructions (in terms of both state complexity and algorithm
run-time) have been obtained.
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Appendix A. Formal Languages and Automata
A standard approach to the problem of representing an infinite collection
of objects via a finite specification is to exploit so-called formal grammars and
their associated machine models. In this section we review some basic elements
and results from this discipline to complement the basic definitions given in
Section 3.2.
Given a formal grammar, G = 〈Σ, V, P, S〉 (Definition 8), and a production
rule α → β ∈ P , for all γ, δ ∈ (V ∪ Σ)∗ we say that γαδ derives γβδ in G
(γαδ ⇒G γβδ) and in general u ⇒∗G w whenever there is a finite sequence of
derivations such that
u⇒G u1 ⇒G u2 ⇒G · · · ⇒G uk ⇒G w
A derivation u ⇒G w is terminated if w ∈ Σ∗. The language generated by
G = 〈Σ, V, P, S〉, denoted as L(G), is
L(G) = { w ∈ Σ∗ : S ⇒∗G w}
A language, L ⊆ Σ∗, is recognisable if there is a formal grammarG = 〈Σ, V, P, S〉
for which w ∈ L if and only if w ∈ L(G).
Notice that, in general, formal grammars provide a process for proving that
w ∈ L(G) and that there is not, necessarily, a unique sequence of derivations
under which S ⇒∗G w.
Definition 17. A grammar 〈Σ, V, P, S〉 is unrestricted if P is allowed to contain
arbitrary rules α → β (subject to the constraint that α 6∈ Σ∗). It is context–
sensitive if ∀ α → β ∈ P we have |β| ≥ |α|; context–free if ∀ α → β ∈ P we
have α ∈ V and right–linear if every α→ β ∈ P has the form Vi → ε or Vi → σ
or Vi → σVj for Vi, Vj ∈ V and σ ∈ Σ.
Recall that a language L is recursively enumerable (r.e.) if there is a Turing
machine (TM) program, M , that given any w ∈ L as input will eventually halt
and accept w; with L being recursive if there is a TM program, M , that given
any w ∈ Σ∗ as input eventually halts and accepts any w ∈ L and halts and
rejects any w 6∈ L. We use the term decidable to describe languages which are
recursive and semi-decidable for those which are recursively enumerable. The
term effective algorithm for L will be used for an algorithmic process, e.g. a
Turing machine program, that witnesses L as decidable.27
Fact 3.
a. L ⊆ Σ∗ is recursively enumerable if and only if there is an unrestricted
grammar, G such that L(G) = L.
27It should be noted that, some closure properties are established non-constructively so that
effective algorithms yielding machines recognising the resulting language do not necessarily
follow, see e.g. [57, pp. 62–63].
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b. L ⊆ Σ∗ is recursive if and only if there are unrestricted grammars, G1 and
G2 such that L(G1) = L and L(G2) = L, i.e. L(G2) = Σ
∗ \ L.
It is well known that there are languages that fail to be r.e.
Regular languages (Definition 7) are captured by a syntactic formalism called
regular expressions. A regular expression, E over Σ is constructed by a finite
number of applications of the following

∅ is a regular expression
ε is a regular expression
σ ∀ σ ∈ Σ is a regular expression
(R+ S) for regular expressions R, S
R · S for regular expressions R, S
(R)∗ for a regular expression R
The associated regular languages L(E) ⊆ Σ∗ being,

∅ if E = ∅
{ε} if E = ε
{σ} if E = σ
L(R) ∪ L(S) if E = (R+ S)
L(R) · L(S) if E = R · S
L(R)∗ if E = (R)∗
In order to reduce notational complications we will, in general, equate a regular
expression, R, with the language, L(R), it describes, thus writing R for both
cases. Where no ambiguity arises, we dispense with superflous parentheses.
Fact 4. Let reg ⊆ 2Σ
∗
be the property describing all regular languages, i.e.
L ∈ reg if and only if L is a regular language. The class reg is closed with
respect to all of the operations θ ∈ {∪, ∩, { }, \, ·,∗ , /, rev}.
The class of machine models that express exactly the regular languages are
the deterministic finite automata (Definition 9), other classes of finite automata
can also be considered.
Definition 18. A non-deterministic finite automaton (ndfa)NM = 〈Σ, Q, q0, F, δ〉
has δ : Q×Σ→ 2Q, indicating that in some states and symbols there may be
more than one “next” state (or even that no state at all can be reached should
δ(q, σ) = ∅). An ε-ndfa has a state transition function δ : Q× Σ ∪ {ε} → 2Q
where the interpretation of δ(q, ε) = Q′ ⊆ Q is that having reached state q
the automaton may process its next input symbol σ ∈ Σ from q itself or from
any state in δ(q, ε). We identify a sub-class, the so-called “ε–dfa” of ε-ndfa via
those whose transition function satisfies: δ : Q×Σ→ Q and δ : Q×{ε} → 2Q,
i.e. ε-dfa specify exactly one successor state for each q ∈ Q and σ ∈ Σ but can
allow arbitrary ε transitions between states.
For a ndfa,M , w = wk ·w2 · · ·w1 ∈ Σ∗ is accepted byM , written w ∈ L(M)
if there is at least one sequence of states qi1qi2 . . . qik such that qi1 ∈ δ(q0, w1),
qij ∈ δ(qij−1 , wj) for 2 ≤ j ≤ k and qik ∈ F . For ε-ndfa w = wk ·wk−1 · · ·w1 ∈
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Σ∗ is accepted byM , if there is a finite sequence qj1qj2 . . . qjr of states with r ≥ k
and a finite sequence α1α2 . . . αr with αi ∈ {ε}∪Σ such that: αr ·αr−1 · · ·α1 =
w, qi1 ∈ δ(q0, α1), qij ∈ δ(qij−1 , αj) for 2 ≤ j ≤ r, and qjr ∈ F . The concept of
acceptance by ε-dfa is defined similarly.
Fact 5. For L ⊆ Σ∗ the following are equivalent.
a. L is a regular language.
b. There is an ε-ndfa, M , for which L(M) = L.
c. There is an ε-dfa, M , for which L(M) = L.
d. There is a ndfa, M , with L(M) = L
e. There is a dfa, M with L(M) = L.
f. There is a right-linear grammar, G, for which L(G) = L.
Fact 6.
a. Given any finite automaton (dfa, ndfa, ε-dfa or ε-ndfa),M = 〈Σ, Q, q0, F, δ〉,
it may decided in polynomial time (in |Q|+ |Σ|) if L(M) = ∅.
b. Given two dfas accepting languages L1 and L2 there are effective algo-
rithms for constructing a dfa accepting L1 ∩L2, L1 ∪L2, L1 \L2, L1/L2.
c. Every regular language L ⊆ Σ∗ has a unique28 minimal number of states
dfa, M for which L(M) = L. Furthermore, given M ′ with L(M ′) = L
the unique minimized automaton, M with L(M) = L(M ′) = L may be
constructed in polynomial time in |QM ′ |+ |Σ|.
Fact 6 (c) is the Myhill-Nerode Theorem [68], a polynomial time algorithm
for constructing the minimal automaton may be found in [57, Ch. 3.4]; the
most efficient (currently known) algorithm is that of Hopcroft [56] which takes
at most O(|Q| log |Q|) steps to minimise a dfa with |Q| states.
Appendix B. Proofs
Appendix B.1. Proofs of Section 4
Proposition 1. For X as introduced in Definition 10, there are choices of
A ⊆ X × X such that there is no formal grammar, G with L(G) = LA ⊆
{0i · 1 · 0j : i, j ≥ 1}.
Proof. It is well-known that Turing machine programs may be encoded as words
in {0, 1}∗ in such a way that if β(M) is the encoding of some TM,M , then there
is a (so-called universal) TM which given the pair 〈β(M), w〉 as input, exactly
simulates the computational steps of M on input w.29 Furthermore it can be
decided if any w ∈ {0, 1}∗ is such that w = β(M) for some TM programM . For
28“Uniqueness” is modulo relabelling states of the automaton.
29See, for example, Hopcroft and Ullman [57, Chap. 8.3] or Dunne [38, Chap. 4] for example
constructions of such universal TMs.
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any such encoding scheme we may use the standard lexicographic ordering30 of
{0, 1}∗ to order TM programs, so that
β(Mi) = The i’th word in the lexicographic ordering of {0, 1}∗
that describes a valid TM encoding.
Finally, we recall that there is no formal grammar, G, that generates the fol-
lowing language:
non-halt-empty = {β(M) : M does not halt given ε as input}
We can now define the language LA with the property required via
LA = {0 · 1 · 0
k : β(Mk) ∈ non-halt-empty}
From which it follows that a grammar G with L(G) = LA allows a grammar
G¬ε−halt with L(G¬ε−halt) = non-halt-empty to be built.
Proposition 2. Given an arbitrary (i.e. unrestricted) grammar G over the
alphabet {0, 1} the problem of determining if L(G) ⊆ {0i ·1·0j : i, j ≥ 1} is not
semi-decidable, i.e. there is no TM program which given (a description of) G as
input halts and accepts precisely those G for which L(G) ⊆ {0i·1·0j : i, j ≥ 1}.
Proof. Immediate consequence of Rice’s Theorem for r.e. Index Sets, [79], see
e.g. [57, pp. 189–192] or [38, pp. 57–66].31
Proposition 3. Given an arbitrary context-sensitive grammar, G, over the
alphabet {0, 1} the problem of determining if L(G) ⊆ {0i · 1 · 0j : i, j ≥ 1} is
not semi-decidable.
Proof. The problem of determining if L(G) = ∅ for an arbitrary context-sensitive
grammar (over alphabet {0, 1}) is not semi-decidable. Given a context-sensitive
grammar G over {0, 1} we construct a context-sensitive grammar G′ over {0, 1}
with the property that L(G′) ⊆ {0i · 1 · 0j : i, j ≥ 1} if and only if L(G) = ∅.
Let S be the start symbol of G. Add a new starting symbol S′ to G with a
single production S′ → 1 · S to give the new grammar G′. Then given that any
word actually generated by G′ must begin with the symbol 1, the only way in
which L(G′) ⊆ {0i · 1 · 0j : i, j ≥ 1} would be if L(G′) = ∅. This can only be
the case if L(G) = ∅ to begin with.
Proposition 4. Given an arbitrary context-free grammar (cfg), G, over the
alphabet {0, 1} the problem of determining if L(G) ⊆ {0i · 1 · 0j : i, j ≥ 1} is
decidable.
30That is, the total ordering <lex in which 0 <lex 1, w <lex u if |w| < |u|, and, when
|w| = |u| w <lex u if w = 0 · v, u = 1 · x or (when w = α · v and u = α · x) if v <lex x.
31Rice’s Theorem for r.e. Index Sets characterises those “properties” of TMs (equivalently,
formal grammars) that are semi-decidable. It is trivial to show that grammars generating
subsets of {0i · 1 · 0j : i, j ≥ 1} fail to meet the conditions for a property to be semi-
decidable.
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Proof. First note that L010 = {0i · 1 · 0j : i, j ≥ 1} is a regular language, and
hence its complement L010 is a regular language too. Now, given G a context-
free grammar over the alphabet {0, 1}, checking L(G) ⊆ L010 is equivalent to
check L(G) ∩ L010 = ∅. It is well-known [57] that the intersection of a context-
free language (in our case L(G)) with a regular language (in our case L010) is
a context-free language, whose specification can be constructed from those of
L(G) and L010. The conclusion then follows from the fact that verifying the
emptyness of the language generated by a context-free grammar can be done in
polynomial time [57].
Proposition 5. Given M = 〈Q, {0, 1}, q0, F, δ〉 a dfa over the alphabet {0, 1}
there is a polynomial (in |Q|) algorithm that decides L(M) ⊆ {0i ·1 ·0j : i, j ≥
1}.
Proof. The dfa, M , accepts a subset of {0i · 1 · 0j : i, j ≥ 1} if and only if
L(M) \ {0i · 1 · 0j : i, j ≥ 1} = ∅. Noting the language {0i · 1 · 0j : i, j ≥ 1} is
regular and that for dfas, M , M ′ a dfa accepting exactly L(M) \ L(M ′) may
be constructed in polynomial time, the proof is completed by observing that
L(M) = ∅ is also decidable in polynomial time for any given dfa.
Proposition 6. Let L be any subset of {0i ·1 ·0j : i, j ≥ 1} with the following
property: there are infinitely many values of k such that {0k · 1 · 0m : m ≥
1}∩L 6= ∅ and for all 0n · 1 · 0m ∈ L, n ≤ m. Then L is not a regular language.
Proof. From the Pumping Lemma for regular languages, cf. [57, Chap. 3.1],
with any regular language, L, there is an associated constant, KL, such that:
for all w ∈ L, with |w| ≥ KL, w = x · y · z with |x · y| < KL, |y| ≥ 1 and
x · yt · z ∈ L for all t ≥ 0. Thus proceeding by contradiction it suffices to
consider some w = 0r · 1 · 0s ∈ L with r ≥ KL: note that the existence of a
suitable w is guaranteed by the premise that there are infinitely many distinct
values of k for which 0k ·1 ·0m ∈ L. Now, since by the condition |x ·y| < KL ≤ r
1 does not belong to x · y, we can write w = x · y · 0a · 1 · 0s = 0p · 0q · 1 · 0s
with q = |y|, p = |x|+ a, and p+ q < KL. It follows that all words of the form
0p+tq · 1 · 0s are in L for all t ≥ 0. Now choosing t so that p + tq > s yields a
word which violates the conditions for membership in L.
Appendix B.2. Proofs of Section 5
Theorem 1. Let p ∈ AE(Σ) be any attack expression over Σ. The mapping
p : 2Σ
∗
→ 2Σ
∗
is reasonable.
Proof. Let p be an attack expression over Σ. We proceed by induction on
size(p) ≥ 0.
The inductive base case involves p ∈ {σ1, . . . , σk, I}. First observe that p
in these cases satisfies the additivity requirement (R1) of Defn. 12 since for
any S ⊆ Σ∗ we have p(S) ∈ {σ1, . . . , σk, S} and for each w ∈ S, p({w}) ∈
{σ1, . . . , σk, {w}}. Hence in the case p = σ we obtain
p(S) = {σ} =
⋃
w∈S
{σ} =
⋃
w∈S
p({w})
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whereas for p = I we have
p(S) = S =
⋃
w∈S
{w} =
⋃
w∈S
p({w})
Finally, since S is assumed regular to begin with, for each of the base case
possibilities, we have p(S) is also regular.
Now inductively assume for some k > 0 and all attack expressions over
Σ, q, with size(q) < k the mapping given via q is a reasonable attack func-
tion. Consider any attack expression, p, over Σ for which size(p) = k. Since
size(p) > 0 its construction must involve (at least) one of the operations from
{∪,KΣ·, ·KΣ, /KΣ,KΣ/,∩KΣ, hd, tl}. We consider these in turn.
If p = q ∪ r then p(S) = (q(S) ∪ r(S)). By the inductive hypothesis q and r
are both reasonable, hence since ∪ preserves both the properties (R1) and (R2)
it follows that p is reasonable.
If p = KΣ · q for some regular subset KΣ of Σ∗
p(S) = KΣ · q(S) =
( ⋃
u∈KΣ
u · q(S)
)
where, from the inductive hypothesis, q is reasonable. Thus
⋃
w∈S
p({w}) =
⋃
w∈S
( ⋃
u∈KΣ
u · q({w})
)
which is ( ⋃
u∈KΣ
u · q(S)
)
by the additivity of q. Again (R2) holds by virtue of the fact that KΣ· preserves
regularity.
The argument for p = q ·KΣ is similar.
If p = q/KΣ then: p(S) = q(S)/KΣ, which, by the additivity of q, is
equivalent to(⋃
w∈S
q({w})
)
/KΣ =
⋃
w∈S
q({w})/KΣ =
⋃
w∈S
p({w})
so that again p is additive from the fact that q is additive. The closure property
is again easily verified.
The case p = KΣ/q is similar.
If p = q ∩KΣ then p(S) is
q(S) ∩KΣ =
(⋃
w∈S
q({w})
)
∩ KΣ
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and(⋃
w∈S
p({w})
)
=
(⋃
w∈S
q({w}) ∩ KΣ
)
=
(⋃
w∈S
q({w})
)
∩ KΣ
so that again additivity holds. Closure is trivially established.
For p = hd(q), we get
p(S) = hd({ w : w ∈ q(S)}) =
⋃
u∈S
hd({ w : w ∈ q({u})} =
⋃
u∈S
p({u})
using additivity of q for the second equality.
To see that (R2) holds it suffices to note that (given a regular language S)
hd(q(S)) ⊆ Σ is finite and hence trivially a regular language.
For p = tl(q):
p(S) = tl({ w : w ∈ q(S)}) = { u : ∃σ ∈ Σ s.t. σ · u ∈ q(S)} =⋃
w∈S
{ u : σ · u ∈ q({w}) } =
⋃
w∈S
p({w})
using the additivity of q for the third equality.
It remains to show p(S) is regular if S is so. Consider a dfa, Mq, accepting
q(S) – such a dfa being guaranteed by the fact that q(S) is regular. In order
to build a dfa accepting tl(q(S)) it suffices to replace its accepting states, Fq
by { r : δ(r, σ) ∈ Fq}. We deduce that tl(q) gives rise to p satisfying R2 thus
completing the inductive argument.
Proposition 7. If µ is a reasonable mapping over the domain 2Σ
∗
then µX is
a reasonable mapping over the domain 2X .
Proof. Let X ⊆ Σ∗ and µ : 2Σ
∗
→ 2Σ
∗
be a reasonable mapping. First note
that µX : 2
X → 2X is additive since for any S ⊆ X we have µX (S) equal to
µ(S) ∩ X =
(⋃
w∈S
µ({w})
)
∩ X =
⋃
w∈S
µ({w}) ∩ X =
⋃
w∈S
µX ({w})
Finally, that µX preserves regularity for regular subsets S of X is immediate
from µX (S) = µ(S) ∩ X .
Theorem 2. Let 〈M, a〉 be an afs with L(M) = X and a ∈ AE(Σ). The
mapping a+ : 2Σ
∗
→ 2Σ
∗
, defined as a+(S) = { v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃ u ∈ S s.t. u ∈ a(v)}
is closed wrt regular languages.
Proof. Consider the various forms that a ∈ AE(Σ) may have. We show by
induction on size(a) that if S is a regular language then a+(S) is a regular
language too.
Case 1. size(a) = 0 (Inductive base - Fact 2.1)
In this case, a ∈ {σ1, . . . , σk, I}.
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For a = σi,
a+(S) =
{
Σ∗ if σi ∈ S
∅ if σi 6∈ S
We note, in view of the properties tl(∅) = ∅, tl({σ}) = ε and ∅ · L = ∅, that
a+(S) = tl(S ∩ {σi}) ·Σ∗, i.e. we do not need to explicitly represent the condi-
tional behaviour, thus allowing one to express a+ as tl(I ∩ σi) · Σ∗.
For a = I, a+(S) = S. Thus in each case a+(S) is a regular language.
Assuming for each a with size(a) < k, that a+(S) is regular, consider a ∈
AE(Σ) with size(a) = k.
Case 2.1 a = b ∪ c (Fact 2.2)
Then
a+(S) = { v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃u ∈ S s.t. u ∈ b({v}) or u ∈ c({v})}
= { v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃u ∈ S s.t. u ∈ b({v})} ∪
{ v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃u ∈ S s.t. u ∈ c({v})}
= b+(S) ∪ c+(S)
Via the inductive hypothesis and the closure properties of regular languages (see
Fact 4 in Appendix A), this is a regular language.
Case 2.2 a = b ·KΣ (Fact 2.3)
a+(S) = { v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃u ∈ S s.t. u ∈ b({v}) ·KΣ}
Recall that the quotient of a language L1 wrt L2 (denoted L1/L2) is
L1/L2 = { p : ∃ q ∈ L2 s.t. p · q ∈ L1}
It is easily seen that for a = b ·KΣ this leads to
a+(S) = { v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃ p ∈ S/KΣ s.t. p ∈ b({v})}
= b+(S/KΣ)
That is, unless u ∈ S has the form p · q with q ∈ KΣ, then a+({u}) = ∅; for
u ∈ S which is of the required form, it is necessary to identify which arguments
these (with the KΣ component removed, i.e. replacing p · q, q ∈ KΣ with p)
attack according to the specification b.
Again, this case is completed by recalling that regular languages – which S
and KΣ are by definition - are closed under the quotient operator (see Fact 4
in Appendix A) and the inductive hypothesis which ensures that b+ preserves
regularity.
Case 2.3 a = KΣ · b (Fact 2.4)
The argument is similar to that used in Case 2.2, so that:
a+(S) = { v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃ u ∈ S s.t. u ∈ KΣ · b({v})}
Hence if w ∈ Σ∗ does not have the form p ·q for some p ∈ KΣ then a
+({w}) = ∅
otherwise a+({w}) = b+({q}), i.e.
a+(S) = b+( { q : ∃ p ∈ KΣ s.t. p · q ∈ S} )
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However, noting that rev(L · R) = rev(R) · rev(L), it follows that p ∈ KΣ
and p · q ∈ S if and only if rev(q) · rev(p) ∈ rev(S) and rev(p) ∈ rev(KΣ) so
that { q : ∃ p ∈ KΣ s.t. p · q ∈ S}) is rev(T ) where
T = { q ∈ Σ∗ : ∃ p ∈ rev(KΣ) s.t. q · p ∈ rev(S) }
= rev(S)/rev(KΣ)
and a+(S) = b+(rev(rev(S)/rev(KΣ))) with this case following since regular
languages are closed under rev().
Case 2.4 a = b/KΣ (Fact 2.5)
a+(S) = { v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃u ∈ S s.t. u ∈ b({v})/KΣ}
= b+(S ·KΣ)
Case 2.5 a = KΣ/b (Fact 2.6)
a+(S) = { v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃u ∈ S s.t. u ∈ KΣ/b({v})}
= { v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃u ∈ S,w ∈ b({v}) s.t. u · w ∈ KΣ}
= { v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃u ∈ S,w ∈ b({v}) s.t. rev(w) · rev(u) ∈ rev(KΣ)}
= { v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃u ∈ rev(S), w ∈ rev(b({v})) s.t. w · u ∈ rev(KΣ)}
= b+(rev(rev(KΣ)/rev(S)))
Case 2.6 a = b ∩KΣ (Fact 2.7)
a+(S) = { v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃u ∈ S s.t. u ∈ (b({v}) ∩KΣ)}
= { v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃u ∈ S ∩KΣ s.t. u ∈ b({v})}
= b+(S ∩KΣ)
Case 2.7 a = hd(b) (Fact 2.8)
a+(S) = { v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃ u ∈ S s.t. u ∈ hd(b(v))}
= { v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃ σ ∈ S ∩ Σ, q ∈ Σ∗ s.t. σ · q ∈ b(v)}
= b+(((S ∩ Σ) · Σ∗))
i.e. if w ∈ S but w 6∈ Σ then a+({w}) = ∅, if σ ∈ S ∩ Σ, then σ attacks every
argument v such that there in an element of b({v}) having the form σ · z.
Case 2.8 a = tl(b) (Fact 2.9)
a+(S) = { v ∈ Σ∗ : ∃u ∈ S s.t. u ∈ tl(b({v})}
from which a+(S) = b+(Σ · S).
Proposition 8. Let 〈M, a〉 be an afs with L(M) = X and a ∈ AE(Σ). Define
the mapping, pi+a : 2
X → 2X by
pi+a (S) = { v ∈ X : ∃ u ∈ S s.t. u→a v}
It holds that pi+a (S) = a
+
X (S).
Proof. By definition pi+a (S) = { v ∈ X : ∃ u ∈ S s.t. u ∈ a(v) ∩ X}, which,
since S ⊆ X , is equivalent to { v ∈ X : ∃ u ∈ S s.t. u ∈ a(v)} = { v ∈
Σ∗ : ∃ u ∈ S s.t. u ∈ a(v)} ∩ X = a+(S) ∩ X = a+X (S).
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Appendix B.3. Proofs of Section 6
Theorem 3. Let 〈M, a〉 be an afs, with induced argumentation framework
〈X ,A〉 and S ⊆ X . The following problems are decidable.
a. Deciding if the set S is conflict free
b. For x ∈ X , deciding if x ∈ F(S), i.e. whether x is acceptable to S
c. Deciding if S ∈ Eadm(〈X ,A〉), i.e. whether S is admissible
d. Deciding if S ∈ Estab(〈X ,A〉), i.e. whether S is a stable extension
e. Constructing a dfa accepting F(S) = X \ pi+a (X \ pi
+
a (S)), i.e. the set of
arguments acceptable to S.
f. Deciding if S ∈ Ecomp(〈X ,A〉), i.e. whether S is a complete extension
Proof. We first observe that validating an instance 〈〈M, a〉,MS〉, whereMS is a
finite automaton accepting S, as legal simply involves checking L(MS) ⊆ L(M),
i.e. constructing an automatonMV accepting L(MS)\L(M) and checking that
L(MV ) = ∅ (see Fact 6(a) in Appendix A).
For (a), S is conflict free if and only if S+ ∩ S = S− ∩ S = ∅. Thus given a
dfa, MS with L(MS) ⊆ X it suffices to check that L(MS) ∩ pi−a (S) = ∅, i.e.
construct Mcf accepting L(MS) ∩ pi−a (S) and check that L(Mcf) = ∅.
In (b), x ∈ F(S) if and only if (y ∈ pi−a ({x})) ⇒ (y ∈ pi
+
a (S)) so that
x ∈ F(S) if and only if pi+a (S) ⊇ pi
−
a ({x}) which can be verified by constructing
suitable automataM+S for pi
+
a (S),M
−
x for pi
−
a ({x}) and checking that L(M
−
x )\
L(M+S ) = ∅.
For (c), S ∈ Eadm(〈X ,A〉) if and only if S is conflict free, which can be
verified using the result of part (a) and S+ ⊇ S−, i.e. every attacker y of an
argument in S is counterattacked by some argument z of S. It follows that
to check S ∈ Eadm(〈X ,A〉) having verified that S is conflict free requires only
checking pi−a (S) \ pi
+
a (S) = ∅.
Part (d) follows by checking that S is conflict free and S ∪ pi+a (S) = X .
To show (e), first observe that X \ pi+a (S) consists of those arguments in
X that are not attacked by any argument in S. It follows that any argument
that is attacked by some y ∈ X \ pi+a (S) cannot be acceptable wrt to S since
S does not contain any counterattack. The set of arguments attacked by some
y ∈ X \ pi+a (S) is just pi
+
a (X \ pi
+
a (S)) and, hence, any argument that does not
belong to this set, i.e. arguments in X \ pi+a (X \ pi
+
a (S)) are acceptable to S.
If S is a regular language, then since all stages preserve regularity, i.e. pi+a (S),
X \ pi+a (S), pi
+
a (X \ pi
+
a (S)) and X \ pi
+
a (X \ pi
+
a (S)) are all regular, from Thm. 2
and the fact that there are effective algorithms for constructing a dfa accepting
S1 \ L2 (see Fact 6 in Appendix A) we can construct the required dfa.
Finally (f) is immediate from (a) and (e) and the definition of Ecomp.
Theorem 4. Let 〈M, a〉 be an afs in which the induced argumentation frame-
work 〈X ,A〉 is finitary. The following problems are all semi-decidable.
a. Determining if Estab(〈X ,A〉) = ∅.
b. Given a finite R ⊂ X , determining if ∀ w ∈ R ¬caadm(〈X ,A〉, w).
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Proof. The approach used is similar for both results and exploits the (proposi-
tional) form of the so-called Compactness Theorem32.
The lexicographic ordering, ≤lex of Σ∗ \ {ε} has u ≤lex v if |u| < |v| or (when
|u| = |v|) if u = σix, v = σjy and i < j or when u = σix, v = σiy if either
x = y = ε or x ≤lex y. We use wi to denote the i’th word in Σ
∗ \ {ε} under this
ordering.
Let Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zk, . . .} be an enumerable infinite set of propositional
variables and define a bijective mapping χ : Z ↔ Σ∗ via χ(zi) = wi. For part
(a) consider the following collection of clauses ϕ(Z):
ϕ(Z) = CONF (Z)
∧
RANGE(Z)
where
CONF (Z) =
∧
{zi : χ(zi)∈X}
∧
{zj : χ(zj) ∈X & χ(zj)→aχ(zi)}
(¬zi ∨ ¬zj)
RANGE(Z) =
∧
{zi : χ(zi)∈X}

 zi ∨ ∨
{zj : χ(zj) ∈X & χ(zj)→aχ(zi)}
zj


Thus if S ∈ Estab(〈X ,A〉) then the assignment zi = ⊤ iff χ(zi) ∈ S will sat-
isfy ϕ(Z) and, conversely, if 〈α1, α2, . . . , ak, . . .〉 is a satisfying assignment to Z
for ϕ(Z) then the subset {χ(zi) : αi = ⊤} ∈ Estab(〈X ,A〉). It follows that
Estab(〈X ,A〉) = ∅ if and only if ϕ(Z) is unsatisfiable, and hence via the Com-
pactness Theorem, if and only if there is a finite subset of clauses from ϕ(Z)
that are collectively unsatisfiable.
For any subset S of Σ∗ let
Cl(S) = conf(S)
∧
range(S)
where
conf(S) =
∧
{zi : χ(zi)∈S}
∧
{zj : χ(zj) ∈X & χ(zj)→aχ(zi)}
(¬zi ∨ ¬zj)
range(S) =
∧
{zi : χ(zi)∈S}

 zi ∨ ∨
{zj : χ(zj) ∈X & χ(zj)→aχ(zi)}
zj


For a finite S both conf(S) and range(S) are finite since for each element
zi of S the set of elements zj corresponding to its attackers is finite. Moreover
32The property that ϕ(Z), an infinite collection of finite clauses – or, more generally, finite
propositional formulae – over an enumerable collection of propositional variables, is satisfiable
if and only if every finite subset of clauses from ϕ(Z) is satisfiable.
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note that the set of clauses in Cl(S) is strictly monotonic wrt inclusion (since
each additional element zi entails the addition of at least a clause in range(S))
and that for each clause in CONF (Z) and RANGE(Z) there is a zi such that
if zi ∈ S then the clause belongs to Cl(S).
Now consider the increasing (wrt inclusion) sequence of finite subsets S
of Σ∗ obtained by adding incrementally the k-th element of Σ∗ \ {ε} in the
lexicographic order. Then for any finite subset Q of clauses from ϕ(Z) it is
clearly the case that there is some S in the sequence for which Q ⊆ Cl(S).
These observations yield the method given in Alg. 2.
Algorithm 2 Semi-decision process for Estab(〈X ,A〉) = ∅ in (finitary) afs
1: S := ∅;
2: k := 0
3: while undecided do
4: k := k + 1;
5: S := S ∪ { wk };
6: if Cl(S) is unsatisfiable then
7: report true
8: end if
9: end while
To establish correctness it is sufficient to note that, by the compactness
theorem, ϕ(Z) is unsatisfiable iff some finite subset Q of its clauses is so, hence
iff there is some finite set SQ ⊆ X with Q ⊆ Cl(SQ) yielding an unsatisfiable
subset of clauses. Since SQ is finite, such a subset will eventually have SQ ⊆ S
in the algorithm iff ϕ(Z) is unsatisfiable, i.e. the Alg. 2 will terminate whenever
Estab(〈X ,A〉) = ∅.
For part (b), the formula ϕ(Z) = CONF (Z) ∧ DEF (Z) ∧ IN(R) is
used, where CONF (Z) is as previously, DEF (Z) is
∧
{zi : χ(zi)∈X}
∧
{zj : χ(zj)∈X & χ(zj)→aχ(zi)}

 ¬zi ∨ ∨
{zk : χ(zk)∈X & χ(zk)→a χ(zj)}
zk


and
IN(R) =
∨
{z : χ(z)∈R}
z
A similar procedure is used to that of Alg. 2, however S in l. 1 is initiated to
R (the finite subset of X forming part of the problem instance) and Cl(S) in
l. 6 is replaced by conf(S) ∧ def(S) ∧ IN(R), so that ϕ(Z) is satisfiable iff
every finite subset of its clauses that include the clause IN(R) is satisfiable:
note that the assignment zi := ⊥ for all i will satisfy every finite subset of
ϕ(Z) \ {IN(R)}.
Proposition 9. Let 〈M, a〉 be an afs with induced argumentation framework
〈X ,→a〉. Let K = {K1Σ, K
2
Σ, . . . ,K
r
Σ} be the set of regular expressions used
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in defining a, i.e. with operations b ·KΣ, KΣ · b, KΣ/b, b/KΣ and b∩KΣ. If no
K ∈ K uses the ∗ operator then 〈X ,→a〉 is finitary.
Proof. Suppose a ∈ AE(Σ) satisfies the conditions of the proposition statement.
Consider any x ∈ X . If, in contradiction to the claim, pi−a ({x}) is unbounded
then a({x}) must yield an infinite language. Let a be a smallest (wrt size)
member of AE(Σ) with this property. Clearly size(a) > 0 since all a with
size(a) = 0 have |a({x})| = 1. Then a must have one of the forms {b ∪ c,KΣ ·
b, b·KΣ,KΣ/b, b/KΣ, b∩KΣ, tl(b), hd(b)}, where size(b) < size(a) and size(c) <
size(a), hence |b({x})| and |c({x})| are finite. The expression, KΣ, uses only
operations from {·,+} and it is easily shown that these cannot generate an
infinite subset of Σ∗. Then it is easy to see that all the operators above give
rise to a finite language, i.e. a({x}) is finite.
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